Windows Event ID 5156: The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection
Written when the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) permits a network connection. It captures all permitted connections and is usable to detect outbound C2 communication and suspicious traffic.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Filtering Platform Connection. It is generated each time WFP permits a connection (outbound/inbound). It includes the source/destination IP and port and the process involved. It is the “permit” event countering the block 5157.
How it is triggered
- When an app connects outbound, or accepts an inbound connection, and WFP permits it.
- Because it corresponds to all successful communication, it appears in extreme volume.
Security review points
- Detecting outbound C2 communication: you can learn which process connected to which destination IP/port. Note outbound connections by unfamiliar processes, non-standard ports, and connections to known malicious IPs/domains.
- Track patterns such as LOLBins (
powershell,rundll32, etc.) connecting outbound, or executables in temp folders communicating, by correlating with process creation 4688.
Notes for log review
- It is enormous since all permitted connections appear. Full volume always-on is impractical; narrow to aggregation by process, destination, and port, or to outbound connections from specific processes (PowerShell, etc.).
- Combine with EDR and proxy logs to evaluate destinations (threat-intelligence matching).
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1071 Application Layer Protocol | Command and Control | Which process connected to which destination (C2 traffic) |
| T1571 Non-Standard Port | Command and Control | Connections to non-standard ports |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0227 (T1571) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 3 and Microsoft Sentinel has 1 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP | Sigma | High |
| Remote PowerShell Sessions Network Connections (WinRM) | Sigma | High |
| AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection - Security | Sigma | Medium |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Application | The process that connected |
Source/Destination Address / Port | The source and destination |
Direction | Outbound/inbound |
Glossary
- C2 (Command and Control) — communication for remotely operating a compromised machine from outside. It often disguises itself as normal ports/services to evade detection.