Windows Event ID 5145: A network share object was checked for desired access (detailed file share)
Written when access is checked for an individual file/folder within a network share. It captures, in detail, which files were accessed via a share, and is usable to detect data exfiltration.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Detailed File Share. Whereas share access 5140 shows “entered the share,” 5145 records the access check for each object within the share (per file name). It includes the requested rights, target file, and source IP.
How it is triggered
- Each time access to a file/folder within a share is requested and checked.
- There are success (S) and failure (F) variants. Failures are logged only when access is denied at the file share level; denials at the file system (NTFS) level are not logged.
Security review points
- Detecting data exfiltration: you can track, per file name, which account accessed which file in a share from which IP. Reading many files in a short time is a sign of data collection/exfiltration.
- Note unexpected access to sensitive shares/files, and bursts of denials (F) (probing permissions). Correlate with share access 5140 and network logon 4624.
Notes for log review
- It appears in huge volume on file servers. Aggregate by target file, source, and count, and narrow to access to sensitive data or bulk reads.
- Because the audit load is high, it is practical to enable it only on important shares.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive | Collection | Which files in a share were read, and by whom. Mass reads in a short time indicate data collection |
| T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Lateral Movement | Access to named pipes under IPC$ (such as svcctl) reveals the remote execution path |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0410 (T1039) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 20 and Microsoft Sentinel has 4 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security | Sigma | High |
| First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe | Sigma | High |
| Impacket PsExec Execution | Sigma | High |
| Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task | Sigma | High |
| Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity | Sigma | High |
| Possible PetitPotam Coerce Authentication Attempt | Sigma | High |
| Protected Storage Service Access | Sigma | High |
| SMB Create Remote File Admin Share | Sigma | High |
| Suspicious PsExec Execution | Sigma | High |
| T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack | Sigma | High |
Other rules (14)
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe | Sigma | Medium |
| Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Remote Service Activity via SVCCTL Named Pipe | Sigma | Medium |
| Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe | Sigma | Medium |
| Startup/Logon Script Added to Group Policy Object | Sigma | Medium |
| Suspicious Access to Sensitive File Extensions | Sigma | Medium |
| Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares | Sigma | Medium |
| Windows Network Access Suspicious desktop.ini Action | Sigma | Medium |
| CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation IPC Access | Sigma (threat-specific) | Critical |
| BlueSky Ransomware Artefacts | Sigma (threat-specific) | High |
| Large Scale Malware Deployment via GPO Scheduled Task Modification | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Potential Exploitation of MS-RPRN printer bug | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Remote Scheduled Task Creation or Update using ATSVC Named Pipe | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility | Sigma (needs setup) | Medium |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Share Name / Relative Target Name | The share and the file/folder within it |
Source Address | The accessing IP |
Access Mask | The requested access rights |
Subject\Account Name | The accessing account |