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Windows Event ID 5136: A directory service object was modified

Written when an Active Directory object’s attributes are modified. It is a top-tier event for catching AD persistence and privilege-escalation tampering such as GPOs, delegation, and AdminSDHolder.

Overview

The subcategory is Audit Directory Service Changes. It is generated when an AD object’s attributes are modified. A value change is normally recorded as two events whose Operation\Type is “Value Deleted” (the old value) and “Value Added” (the new value), so reading the pair together powerfully shows what changed and how. Generation requires change auditing in the target object’s SACL. It is recorded on domain controllers.

How it is triggered

  • When an AD object’s (user, computer, GPO, OU, group, etc.) attributes are added, changed, or deleted.
  • One change typically produces two events, “Value Deleted” and “Value Added”. Pair them to see the old and new values.

Security review points

Many attacks against AD leave traces in this event.

  • GPO tampering: changes to a Group Policy container / gPCFileSysPath are a technique to distribute malicious scripts and settings to subordinate machines. Confirm changes to GPO objects at top priority.
  • AdminSDHolder ACL change: a change to the nTSecurityDescriptor of the AdminSDHolder object is persistence that propagates to all privileged accounts (see 4780).
  • Delegation settings: changes to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity (RBCD) or servicePrincipalName are preparation for impersonation or Kerberoasting.
  • Also notable: sAMAccountName spoofing (noPac), dNSHostName spoofing (Certifried / CVE-2022-26923), dangerous changes to userAccountControl flags, and rewriting scriptPath (logon script).

Notes for log review

  • It occurs in volume even during legitimate administration. Narrow to monitored attributes (GPO-related, security descriptor, delegation, SPN, UAC flags, etc.) and evaluate by the “Value Deleted” / “Value Added” pairs.
  • It is not recorded unless a SACL is set on the important attributes. The prerequisite is enabling change auditing for sensitive objects/attributes in the AD audit design.
  • Strongly suspect it if the changing subject (Subject) is an account that does not normally manage that object.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1484.001 Group Policy ModificationDefense Impairment, Privilege EscalationChanges to Group Policy containers or gPCFileSysPath
T1098 Account ManipulationPersistence, Privilege EscalationChanges to the AdminSDHolder ACL or RBCD (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity)
T1558.003 KerberoastingCredential AccessPreparing targeted Kerberoasting by adding a servicePrincipalName
T1037.003 Network Logon ScriptPersistence, Privilege EscalationRewriting scriptPath (logon script)

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0305 (T1484.001) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 11 and Microsoft Sentinel has 17 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.

RuleTypeSeverity
Active Directory User BackdoorsSigmaHigh
AdminSDHolder ModificationsSentinel analytics ruleHigh
Exchange OAB Virtual Directory Attribute Containing Potential WebshellSentinel analytics ruleHigh
Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled TaskSigmaHigh
Possible Shadow Credentials AddedSigmaHigh
Potential Kerberos Coercion by Spoofing SPNs via DNS ManipulationSigmaHigh
Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend RightSigmaHigh
Suspicious LDAP-Attributes UsedSigmaHigh
Group Policy Abuse for Privilege AdditionSigmaMedium
Possible DC Shadow AttackSigmaMedium
Other rules (18)
RuleTypeSeverity
Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation AbuseSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Service Principal Name (SPN) Assigned to User AccountSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Startup/Logon Script Added to Group Policy ObjectSigmaMedium
Windows Default Domain GPO ModificationSigmaMedium
PROD (TM001.1) - GROUP - Added to Group Outside the Object Tier LevelSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM004.1) - OBJECT - Enabled, Disabled, Unlocked, or Password Reset of a Tier Level ObjectSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM005.1) - GPO - Linked, Unlinked, or Enforced at Tier Level OUSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM006.1) - ACL - Modified at Tier Level OUSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM008.1) - GPO - Linked, Unlinked, or Enforced at Root of DomainSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM009.1) - ACL - Modified at Root of the DomainSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM012.1) - GPO - Enforced Outside of Tier ModelSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM013.1) - OU - Block Inheritance was Enabled on an OUSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM014.1) - GPO - Linked, Unlinked, or Enforced at the AD Site LevelSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM015.1) - ACL - Modified at KRBTGT or AdminSDHolder Object LevelSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM016.1) - GROUP - Added to Well-Known or Tier Model GroupSentinel (needs setup)High
PROD (TM017.1) - GROUP - Tier 0 Added to Allow RODC Password Replication GroupSentinel (needs setup)High
msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink Attribute ModifiedSigma (needs setup)Medium
PROD (TM011.1) - LAPS - Tier Level Computer Object LAPS Password Expiration Time Set ManuallySentinel (needs setup)Low

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Object DN / ClassThe changed object and its class
AttributeThe changed attribute name
Value / Operation\TypeThe attribute value, and whether it was deleted (Value Deleted) or added (Value Added)
Subject\Account NameThe subject that made the change

References