Windows Event ID 5136: A directory service object was modified
Written when an Active Directory object’s attributes are modified. It is a top-tier event for catching AD persistence and privilege-escalation tampering such as GPOs, delegation, and AdminSDHolder.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Directory Service Changes. It is generated when an AD object’s attributes are modified. A value change is normally recorded as two events whose Operation\Type is “Value Deleted” (the old value) and “Value Added” (the new value), so reading the pair together powerfully shows what changed and how. Generation requires change auditing in the target object’s SACL. It is recorded on domain controllers.
How it is triggered
- When an AD object’s (user, computer, GPO, OU, group, etc.) attributes are added, changed, or deleted.
- One change typically produces two events, “Value Deleted” and “Value Added”. Pair them to see the old and new values.
Security review points
Many attacks against AD leave traces in this event.
- GPO tampering: changes to a Group Policy container /
gPCFileSysPathare a technique to distribute malicious scripts and settings to subordinate machines. Confirm changes to GPO objects at top priority. - AdminSDHolder ACL change: a change to the
nTSecurityDescriptorof theAdminSDHolderobject is persistence that propagates to all privileged accounts (see 4780). - Delegation settings: changes to
msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity(RBCD) orservicePrincipalNameare preparation for impersonation or Kerberoasting. - Also notable:
sAMAccountNamespoofing (noPac),dNSHostNamespoofing (Certifried / CVE-2022-26923), dangerous changes touserAccountControlflags, and rewritingscriptPath(logon script).
Notes for log review
- It occurs in volume even during legitimate administration. Narrow to monitored attributes (GPO-related, security descriptor, delegation, SPN, UAC flags, etc.) and evaluate by the “Value Deleted” / “Value Added” pairs.
- It is not recorded unless a SACL is set on the important attributes. The prerequisite is enabling change auditing for sensitive objects/attributes in the AD audit design.
- Strongly suspect it if the changing subject (
Subject) is an account that does not normally manage that object.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1484.001 Group Policy Modification | Defense Impairment, Privilege Escalation | Changes to Group Policy containers or gPCFileSysPath |
| T1098 Account Manipulation | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Changes to the AdminSDHolder ACL or RBCD (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity) |
| T1558.003 Kerberoasting | Credential Access | Preparing targeted Kerberoasting by adding a servicePrincipalName |
| T1037.003 Network Logon Script | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Rewriting scriptPath (logon script) |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0305 (T1484.001) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 11 and Microsoft Sentinel has 17 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Active Directory User Backdoors | Sigma | High |
| AdminSDHolder Modifications | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| Exchange OAB Virtual Directory Attribute Containing Potential Webshell | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task | Sigma | High |
| Possible Shadow Credentials Added | Sigma | High |
| Potential Kerberos Coercion by Spoofing SPNs via DNS Manipulation | Sigma | High |
| Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right | Sigma | High |
| Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used | Sigma | High |
| Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition | Sigma | Medium |
| Possible DC Shadow Attack | Sigma | Medium |
Other rules (18)
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Object DN / Class | The changed object and its class |
Attribute | The changed attribute name |
Value / Operation\Type | The attribute value, and whether it was deleted (Value Deleted) or added (Value Added) |
Subject\Account Name | The subject that made the change |