Windows Event ID 4776: The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account (NTLM)
Written whenever credentials are validated via NTLM authentication. It is a cornerstone of authentication monitoring, usable to detect password spraying, brute force, and pass-the-hash over the NTLM path.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Credential Validation. It is generated when credentials are validated via NTLM (the older Windows authentication protocol). Local-account validation is recorded on that machine; domain-account validation on the domain controller that handles authentication. The success/failure reason appears in Error Code.
How it is triggered
- NTLM authentication (local logon, file shares, legacy apps, and so on).
- The failure reason appears in
Error Code. Common examples:0xC000006Awrong password (correct username + wrong password)0xC0000064nonexistent username0xC0000234locked out
Security review points
- Password spraying/brute force over NTLM: watch whether
0xC000006Afailures occur from a single source across many accounts (spraying) or consecutively against a single account (brute force). Together with Kerberos 4771, it is one of the two pillars of authentication-failure monitoring. - Pass-the-hash: NTLM authentication with a stolen hash remains as a success 4776. Note anomalies such as a
Source Workstationthat differs from usual, or a service account authenticating from an unexpected machine. Correlate with network logon 4624 (Type 3, NTLM). - Heavy NTLM use in a modern environment is itself a weakness (not having moved to Kerberos) and a path attackers favor.
Notes for log review
- It appears in volume on domain controllers. Using
Error Code,Source Workstation, and target account as axes, correlate concentrations of failures (spraying/brute force) and anomalous successes (PtH). - Failures by devices/services holding old credentials (self-inflicted) are also common. Separate attack from configuration-induced by source.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1110.003 Password Spraying | Credential Access | 0xC000006A failures from one source against many accounts |
| T1110.001 Password Guessing | Credential Access | Consecutive 0xC000006A failures against one account |
| T1550.002 Pass the Hash | Lateral Movement | NTLM authentication with a stolen hash is logged as a success |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 3 and Microsoft Sentinel has 1 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Hacktool Ruler | Sigma | High |
| Metasploit SMB Authentication | Sigma | High |
| Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons | Sigma | Medium |
| Failed Login Attempt by Expired account | Sentinel hunting query | - |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Logon Account | The account being validated |
Source Workstation | The name of the machine making the authentication request |
Error Code | 0x0 success, 0xC000006A wrong password, 0xC0000064 unknown user, etc. |
Glossary
- NTLM — an older challenge/response authentication protocol. It is weak to pass-the-hash; replace it with Kerberos where possible.