Windows Event ID 4771: Kerberos pre-authentication failed
Written when the KDC could not issue a TGT due to pre-authentication failure. It is the cornerstone of authentication-failure monitoring for catching password spraying and brute force over the Kerberos path.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Kerberos Authentication Service. It is generated when pre-authentication (the mechanism that verifies, before issuing a TGT, that the requester holds the correct password) fails, recorded only on domain controllers. Causes include a wrong password, expiration, and smart-card certificate problems. It is not generated for accounts with pre-authentication disabled (see 4768 in that case).
How it is triggered
- A logon attempt with a wrong password on a domain account.
- The reason appears in
Failure Code. Common examples:0x18wrong password (correct username + wrong password) = the main signal of spraying/brute force0x12account disabled/locked/expired/out of hours0x17password expired0x25clock skew too great
Security review points
- Password spraying: a pattern where
Failure Code 0x18failures spread from one source across many accounts. Use a threshold such as more than 500x18events in one minute. Attacks over the LDAP/Kerberos path that produce no 4625 (NTLM-type failures) are caught by this 4771. - Brute force: consecutive
0x18against a single account. Correlate with lockout 4740. - Attempts with nonexistent usernames are not logged as 4771 but as 4768 failures (
0x6). Track username enumeration there, aggregated by source IP (Client Address).
Notes for log review
- “Self-inflicted” failures by devices/services holding old credentials are also common. Separate attack from configuration-induced causes by source IP and target account.
- Beyond 4771, combine TGT requests 4768, NTLM validation 4776, and lockout 4740 to build the full picture of authentication failures.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1110.003 Password Spraying | Credential Access | 0x18 failures spreading from one source to many accounts |
| T1110.001 Password Guessing | Credential Access | Consecutive 0x18 failures against a single account |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0487 (T1110.003) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 1 public detection rule that uses this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Kerberos Manipulation | Sigma | High |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Account Name | The targeted account |
Client Address | The source IP of the attempt; an aggregation axis |
Failure Code | The failure reason (0x18 wrong password, 0x12 account disabled/locked, etc.) |
Pre-Authentication Type | The pre-authentication type used |