Skip to content

Windows Event ID 4771: Kerberos pre-authentication failed

Written when the KDC could not issue a TGT due to pre-authentication failure. It is the cornerstone of authentication-failure monitoring for catching password spraying and brute force over the Kerberos path.

Overview

The subcategory is Audit Kerberos Authentication Service. It is generated when pre-authentication (the mechanism that verifies, before issuing a TGT, that the requester holds the correct password) fails, recorded only on domain controllers. Causes include a wrong password, expiration, and smart-card certificate problems. It is not generated for accounts with pre-authentication disabled (see 4768 in that case).

How it is triggered

  • A logon attempt with a wrong password on a domain account.
  • The reason appears in Failure Code. Common examples:
    • 0x18 wrong password (correct username + wrong password) = the main signal of spraying/brute force
    • 0x12 account disabled/locked/expired/out of hours
    • 0x17 password expired
    • 0x25 clock skew too great

Security review points

  • Password spraying: a pattern where Failure Code 0x18 failures spread from one source across many accounts. Use a threshold such as more than 50 0x18 events in one minute. Attacks over the LDAP/Kerberos path that produce no 4625 (NTLM-type failures) are caught by this 4771.
  • Brute force: consecutive 0x18 against a single account. Correlate with lockout 4740.
  • Attempts with nonexistent usernames are not logged as 4771 but as 4768 failures (0x6). Track username enumeration there, aggregated by source IP (Client Address).

Notes for log review

  • “Self-inflicted” failures by devices/services holding old credentials are also common. Separate attack from configuration-induced causes by source IP and target account.
  • Beyond 4771, combine TGT requests 4768, NTLM validation 4776, and lockout 4740 to build the full picture of authentication failures.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential Access0x18 failures spreading from one source to many accounts
T1110.001 Password GuessingCredential AccessConsecutive 0x18 failures against a single account

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0487 (T1110.003) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 1 public detection rule that uses this event ID as a condition.

RuleTypeSeverity
Kerberos ManipulationSigmaHigh

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Account NameThe targeted account
Client AddressThe source IP of the attempt; an aggregation axis
Failure CodeThe failure reason (0x18 wrong password, 0x12 account disabled/locked, etc.)
Pre-Authentication TypeThe pre-authentication type used

References