Windows Event ID 4756: A member was added to a security-enabled universal group
Written when a member is added to a security-enabled universal group. Addition to the forest’s top-level Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins leads directly to control of the entire forest, making it a top-tier account-management event.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Security Group Management. It is generated when a new member is added to a universal group, recorded only on domain controllers. One event appears per added member. As with the global-group 4728, the Member\Account Name is recorded as a distinguished name (DN) (for example, CN=Auditor,CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=local). The local-group counterpart is 4732.
How it is triggered
- Member addition to a universal group via
Add-ADGroupMember, Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC), and so on.
Security review points
- Addition to a forest-wide privileged group is most important.
Enterprise Admins, which controls the forest, andSchema Admins, which can modify the schema, are both universal groups, so additions to them are recorded as 4756. These additions lead directly to compromise of the entire forest, so monitor them at top priority. - A sequence of account creation 4720 then addition to a high-privilege universal group 4756 suggests forest-scale backdoor creation.
- Addition to a global group is 4728; addition to a local group is 4732. Do not confuse the scopes.
Notes for log review
- Because the member is recorded as a DN, it looks hard to read at first. Resolve the
CN=portion to make clear which account was added. - Treat additions to
Enterprise Admins/Schema Adminsas a high-priority event that almost never occurs in normal operation; alert on even a single occurrence. - Changes replicate across the forest via the Global Catalog. Keep the scope of impact in mind and correlate with 4754 and related account creation.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Additions to forest-wide privileged groups such as Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0310 (T1098.007) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 1 and Microsoft Sentinel has 7 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Group created then added to built in domain local or global group | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Account added and removed from privileged groups | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| User account added to built in domain local or global group | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| Potential Exploitation of CVE-2024-37085 - Suspicious ESX Admins Group Activity | Sigma (threat-specific) | High |
| Group added to Built in Domain Local or Global Group | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Tracking Privileged Account Rare Activity | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| User account added or removed from a security group by an unauthorized user | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| User Account added to Built in Sensitive or Privileged Domain Local or Global Group | Sentinel hunting query | - |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Group\Group Name | The group a member was added to (check whether high-privilege such as Enterprise Admins) |
Member\Account Name | The added member, recorded as a distinguished name (DN) |
Subject\Account Name | The subject that performed the addition |