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Windows Event ID 4756: A member was added to a security-enabled universal group

Written when a member is added to a security-enabled universal group. Addition to the forest’s top-level Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins leads directly to control of the entire forest, making it a top-tier account-management event.

Overview

The subcategory is Audit Security Group Management. It is generated when a new member is added to a universal group, recorded only on domain controllers. One event appears per added member. As with the global-group 4728, the Member\Account Name is recorded as a distinguished name (DN) (for example, CN=Auditor,CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=local). The local-group counterpart is 4732.

How it is triggered

  • Member addition to a universal group via Add-ADGroupMember, Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC), and so on.

Security review points

  • Addition to a forest-wide privileged group is most important. Enterprise Admins, which controls the forest, and Schema Admins, which can modify the schema, are both universal groups, so additions to them are recorded as 4756. These additions lead directly to compromise of the entire forest, so monitor them at top priority.
  • A sequence of account creation 4720 then addition to a high-privilege universal group 4756 suggests forest-scale backdoor creation.
  • Addition to a global group is 4728; addition to a local group is 4732. Do not confuse the scopes.

Notes for log review

  • Because the member is recorded as a DN, it looks hard to read at first. Resolve the CN= portion to make clear which account was added.
  • Treat additions to Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins as a high-priority event that almost never occurs in normal operation; alert on even a single occurrence.
  • Changes replicate across the forest via the Global Catalog. Keep the scope of impact in mind and correlate with 4754 and related account creation.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain GroupsPersistence, Privilege EscalationAdditions to forest-wide privileged groups such as Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0310 (T1098.007) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 1 and Microsoft Sentinel has 7 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.

RuleTypeSeverity
Group created then added to built in domain local or global groupSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Account added and removed from privileged groupsSentinel analytics ruleLow
User account added to built in domain local or global groupSentinel analytics ruleLow
Potential Exploitation of CVE-2024-37085 - Suspicious ESX Admins Group ActivitySigma (threat-specific)High
Group added to Built in Domain Local or Global GroupSentinel hunting query-
Tracking Privileged Account Rare ActivitySentinel hunting query-
User account added or removed from a security group by an unauthorized userSentinel hunting query-
User Account added to Built in Sensitive or Privileged Domain Local or Global GroupSentinel hunting query-

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Group\Group NameThe group a member was added to (check whether high-privilege such as Enterprise Admins)
Member\Account NameThe added member, recorded as a distinguished name (DN)
Subject\Account NameThe subject that performed the addition

References