Windows Event ID 4742: A computer account was changed
Written when a computer object’s (machine account’s) attributes are changed. It is an important event for catching attribute alterations abused for privilege escalation, such as delegation setting changes.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Computer Account Management. It is generated whenever a computer object is changed, recorded only on domain controllers. After a domain join, on the reboot for example, the Subject SID and the “changed computer account” SID may match (a self-update).
How it is triggered
- Changes to machine-account attributes (delegation settings,
servicePrincipalName,userAccountControlflags, DNS name, and so on). - It also occurs on automatic updates right after a domain join.
Security review points
- Delegation-related attribute changes are most important. If
msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity(the resource-based constrained delegation, RBCD, setting) is rewritten, an attacker can impersonate other accounts. A flow of machine-account creation 4741 then setting delegation in 4742 is a hallmark of RBCD abuse. - Also note enabling
TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION(unconstrained delegation) and unexpected changes toservicePrincipalNameordNSHostName(SPN removal is seen in noPac preparation, and rewritingdNSHostNamein Certifried preparation). - Strongly suspect it if the changing subject does not normally have rights to manage that machine.
Notes for log review
- It appears frequently with domain joins and legitimate configuration changes. Focus on the type of attribute changed, and alert narrowed to delegation, SPN, and UAC flag changes.
- Self-updates (Subject = target) tend to be noise. Exclude these to surface delegation-setting changes by others.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1098 Account Manipulation | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Setting msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity (RBCD) or TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION |
| T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Privilege Escalation | noPac preparation such as removing servicePrincipalName |
| T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | Credential Access | Certifried (CVE-2022-26923) preparation by rewriting dNSHostName |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 2 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Possible DC Shadow Attack | Sigma | Medium |
| Potential Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) Exploitation | Sigma (needs setup) | High |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Computer Account That Was Changed | The changed machine account |
AllowedToDelegateTo / delegation attributes | The delegation setting change |
Subject\Account Name | The subject that made the change |
Glossary
- RBCD (resource-based constrained delegation) — a delegation setting that lets one account impersonate another to access a service. Abused, it is used for privilege escalation.