Windows Event ID 4732: A member was added to a security-enabled local group
Written when a member is added to a security-enabled local group. Addition to a privileged group such as Administrators leads directly to privilege escalation, making it a top-tier account-management event.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Security Group Management. It is generated when a new member is added to a local group, recorded on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations alike. One event appears per added member.
How it is triggered
- Member addition via
net localgroup Administrators <user> /add, Computer Management,Add-LocalGroupMember, and so on.
Security review points
- Addition to a privileged group is most important. Adding to
Administrators(local administrators) grants that account admin rights, a hallmark of privilege escalation and persistence. Addition toRemote Desktop Users(gaining an RDP path) is also notable. - A sequence of account creation 4720 then privileged-group addition 4732 strongly suggests creating a backdoor administrator account.
- Confirm the added target and adding subject are as expected. Addition to domain global/universal groups is a separate event (4728 / 4756).
Notes for log review
- It also occurs during legitimate privilege grants. Narrow by group name (whether privileged) and normal patterns of target and subject. Alert on additions to
Administratorsat high priority in particular. - Together with removal 4733, track membership changes. A short add-then-remove can be a move to hide temporary privilege use.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Additions to Administrators or Remote Desktop Users |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0310 (T1098.007) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 1 and Microsoft Sentinel has 8 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Group created then added to built in domain local or global group | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| User Added to Local Administrator Group | Sigma | Medium |
| Account added and removed from privileged groups | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| New user created and added to the built-in administrators group | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| User account added to built in domain local or global group | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| Group added to Built in Domain Local or Global Group | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Tracking Privileged Account Rare Activity | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| User account added or removed from a security group by an unauthorized user | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| User Account added to Built in Sensitive or Privileged Domain Local or Global Group | Sentinel hunting query | - |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Group\Group Name | The group a member was added to (check if privileged) |
Member\Security ID / Account Name | The added member |
Subject\Account Name | The subject that performed the addition |