Windows Event ID 4704: A user right was assigned
Written when the local user rights policy is changed and a user right (privilege) is assigned to an account; logon rights are recorded by 4717 instead. It captures the laying of groundwork for escalation or persistence through privilege grants.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Authorization Policy Change. It is generated when a local user right (a privilege such as SeDebugPrivilege or SeBackupPrivilege) is granted to an account. As the original documentation states, it covers user rights only; granting logon rights such as “Log on as a service” is recorded by 4717. One event appears per assigned user.
How it is triggered
- User rights assignment via Local Security Policy or Group Policy.
- Granting rights via
seceditor APIs.
Security review points
- Granting a strong right can be preparation for privilege escalation or persistence. New grants of
SeDebugPrivilege(manipulate other processes’ memory),SeTcbPrivilege(act as part of the OS) are notable. Check grants of logon rights such as “Log on as a service” with 4717. - Granting rights to an unexpected account (especially an ordinary user or a new account) suggests an attacker establishing a foothold. Together with removal 4705, track the evolution of rights.
Notes for log review
- Rights are also granted during legitimate server build-out and application deployment. Match against normal patterns of the granted right type, target account, and acting subject.
- Treat audit-policy and rights changes as significant, and monitor them at high priority together with policy-change events (such as audit-policy change 4719).
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1098 Account Manipulation | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Granting powerful rights such as SeDebugPrivilege to unexpected accounts to dig in |
| T1484.001 Group Policy Modification | Defense Impairment, Privilege Escalation | If the right came through a GPO, check for Group Policy tampering |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0305 (T1484.001) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 1 public detection rule that uses this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects | Sigma | High |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Target Account\Account Name / New Right\User Right | The account granted the right and the assigned right |
Subject\Account Name | The account that made the change |
Glossary
- User right — privileges such as
SeDebugPrivilege(debug programs). 4704 covers user rights only; logon rights such as “Log on as a service” are recorded by 4717.