Windows Event ID 4698: A scheduled task was created
Written when a new scheduled task is created. Tasks survive reboots and auto-run at set times or conditions, so they are heavily used for persistence, execution, and privilege escalation, making this a cornerstone detection event.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Other Object Access Events. It is generated when a new scheduled task is registered. The key to reading it is that, besides the task name and creating account, the event includes the task’s full XML definition (executable path, arguments, triggers, and the privileges it runs under).
How it is triggered
- Task registration via
schtasks.exe, the Task Scheduler GUI,Register-ScheduledTask(PowerShell), or APIs. - Remote task creation can also be a path for lateral movement.
Security review points
- It maps to MITRE ATT&CK
T1053.005 (Scheduled Task: abusing the task scheduler to run code recurringly or at a set time)and is used for Execution, Persistence, and Privilege Escalation alike. - Scrutinize the XML definition. Danger signs include an
Actionsexecutable pointing topowershell/cmd, a temp folder, or a suspicious path; encoded arguments like-enc; aPrincipalrunning with SYSTEM rights; and a trigger at logon or at short intervals. - Together with deletion 4699, enabling 4700, disabling 4701, and updating 4702, track the task’s full lifecycle.
Notes for log review
- Legitimate software and the OS create many tasks. Baseline the normal patterns of task name, executable path, and creating subject, and watch for deviations.
- A hidden-task technique that directly manipulates the registry
...\Schedule\TaskCache\Treemay not produce a 4698. Supplement in layers with registry auditing and the Task Scheduler operational log (Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/OperationalEvent ID 106, and so on).
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task | Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Red flags in the XML definition’s Actions, Principal, and triggers |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0441 (T1053.005) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 5 and Microsoft Sentinel has 3 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation | Sigma | High |
| Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Diamond Sleet APT Scheduled Task Creation | Sigma (threat-specific) | Critical |
| OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - Security | Sigma (threat-specific) | Critical |
| Kapeka Backdoor Scheduled Task Creation | Sigma (threat-specific) | High |
| Scheduled Tasks Names Used By SVR For GraphicalProton Backdoor | Sigma (threat-specific) | High |
| Scheduled Task Creation or Update from User Writable Directory | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Scheduled Task Executing from Abnormal Location | Sentinel hunting query | - |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Task Name | The created task name |
Task Content (XML) | The task definition: executable, arguments, triggers, run privileges |
Subject\Account Name | The account that created the task |
Glossary
- Scheduled task — a Windows mechanism that automatically runs a program at set times or conditions. It is a frequent foothold for attackers.