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Windows Event ID 4688: A new process has been created

Written every time a new process starts. Because it keeps the executable path, the parent process, and (if configured) the command line, it is one of the most important events for catching attack execution.

Overview

The subcategory is Audit Process Creation. It is generated whenever a process is created, recording the new process path (New Process Name), the creating process (Creator Process Name), and the executing account. By default the command-line arguments are not recorded, but enabling the Group Policy “Include command line in process creation events” adds Process Command Line and greatly improves detection capability.

How it is triggered

  • Any process start. It appears for applications, scripts, and OS-internal activity alike.
  • Command-line recording requires, in addition to Success auditing for Audit Process Creation, enabling ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled (the GPO above).

Security review points

  • Parent-child relationship: detect suspicious launch chains by the pair of Creator Process Name (parent) and New Process Name (child). For example, winword.exe spawning powershell.exe, or w3wp.exe spawning cmd.exe, are improbable pairs that signal compromise.
  • LOLBins (living-off-the-land binaries): track abuse of built-in OS tools, such as certutil.exe downloading files, regsvr32.exe running remote scripts, and suspicious use of mshta / rundll32 / bitsadmin.
  • Command line: look in Process Command Line for encoded PowerShell (-enc), obfuscation, stealth options like -nop -w hidden, and external URLs.
  • Also evaluate the executing account and the path (outside standard folders or in a temp folder).

Notes for log review

  • Every process start appears, so the volume is enormous. It is unmanageable unless distilled, in a SIEM, into correlation rules using parent-child, command line, and path.
  • A blank command line likely means the GPO above is not configured. Confirm the setting as a prerequisite for detection.
  • The command line can contain sensitive data such as passwords, so handle it carefully during collection and retention.
  • Its role overlaps with EDR and Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation). When both exist, reconcile them; when only 4688 exists, be sure to enable the command-line setting.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1059.001 PowerShellExecutionPowerShell launched with -enc or -nop -w hidden
T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecutioncmd.exe spawned from processes such as w3wp.exe
T1204.002 Malicious FileExecutionShells launched from Office documents such as winword.exe
T1218 System Binary Proxy ExecutionStealthAbuse of built-in binaries such as regsvr32 / mshta / rundll32
T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand and ControlFile downloads with certutil.exe or bitsadmin

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0202 (T1059.003) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

Microsoft Sentinel has 68 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.

RuleTypeSeverity
CertUtil Used for File Download (Living off the Land)Sentinel analytics ruleHigh
New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller PoliciesSentinel analytics ruleHigh
Security Service Registry ACL ModificationSentinel analytics ruleHigh
WMI Spawning Suspicious Child Process (Living off the Land)Sentinel analytics ruleHigh
Base64 encoded Windows process command-linesSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Email access via active syncSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via Remote WMI ExecutionSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled TaskSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Malware in the recycle binSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Network endpoint to host executable correlationSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Other rules (58)
RuleTypeSeverity
NRT Base64 Encoded Windows Process Command-linesSentinel analytics ruleMedium
NRT Process executed from binary hidden in Base64 encoded fileSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Potential Build Process CompromiseSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Potential Fodhelper UAC BypassSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command LineSentinel analytics ruleMedium
PowerShell Encoded Command Execution (Living off the Land)Sentinel analytics ruleMedium
Process executed from binary hidden in Base64 encoded fileSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Process Execution Frequency AnomalySentinel analytics ruleMedium
Sdelete deployed via GPO and run recursivelySentinel analytics ruleMedium
Windows Binaries Executed from Non-Default DirectorySentinel analytics ruleMedium
Potential re-named sdelete usageSentinel analytics ruleLow
Caramel Tsunami Actor IOC - July 2021Sentinel (threat-specific)High
Dev-0270 Malicious Powershell usageSentinel (threat-specific)High
DEV-0270 New User CreationSentinel (threat-specific)High
Dev-0270 Registry IOC - September 2022Sentinel (threat-specific)High
Dev-0270 WMIC DiscoverySentinel (threat-specific)High
Identify Mango Sandstorm powershell commandsSentinel (threat-specific)High
Identify SysAid Server web shell creationSentinel (threat-specific)High
Unusual identity creation using exchange powershellSentinel (threat-specific)High
Zinc Actor IOCs files - October 2022Sentinel (threat-specific)High
Midnight Blizzard - Script payload stored in RegistrySentinel (threat-specific)Medium
Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32.exe execution of vbscriptSentinel (threat-specific)Medium
Silk Typhoon New UM Service Child ProcessSentinel (threat-specific)Medium
Suspicious command line tokens in LolBins or LolScriptsSentinel hunting queryMedium
Remote Task Creation/Update using Schtasks ProcessSentinel hunting queryLow
Backup DeletionSentinel hunting query-
Commands executed by WMI on new hosts - potential ImpacketSentinel hunting query-
Cscript script daily summary breakdownSentinel hunting query-
Discord download invoked from cmd lineSentinel hunting query-
Domain controller installation media creationSentinel hunting query-
Download of New File Using CurlSentinel hunting query-
Entropy for Processes for a given HostSentinel hunting query-
Enumeration of users and groupsSentinel hunting query-
Establishing internal proxiesSentinel hunting query-
Exchange PowerShell Snapin AddedSentinel hunting query-
External IP address in Command LineSentinel hunting query-
Host Exporting Mailbox and Removing ExportSentinel hunting query-
Hosts Running a Rare ProcessSentinel hunting query-
Hosts Running a Rare Process with CommandlineSentinel hunting query-
Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine Usage.Sentinel hunting query-
Least Common Parent And Child Process PairsSentinel hunting query-
Least Common Processes by Command LineSentinel hunting query-
Least Common Processes Including Folder DepthSentinel hunting query-
Metasploit / Impacket PsExec Process Creation ActivitySentinel hunting query-
New Child Process of W3WP.exeSentinel hunting query-
New PowerShell scripts encoded on the commandlineSentinel hunting query-
New processes observed in last 24 hoursSentinel hunting query-
Nishang Reverse TCP Shell in Base64Sentinel hunting query-
Potential Microsoft Security Services TamperingSentinel hunting query-
Powercat DownloadSentinel hunting query-
PowerShell downloadsSentinel hunting query-
Rare Process PathSentinel hunting query-
Rare Processes Run by Service AccountsSentinel hunting query-
Summary of users created using uncommon/undocumented commandline switchesSentinel hunting query-
Suspected LSASS DumpSentinel hunting query-
Suspicious Enumeration using Adfind ToolSentinel hunting query-
TI Map File Entity to Security EventSentinel hunting query-
Uncommon processes - bottom 5%Sentinel hunting query-

In addition, the 1415 Sigma rules in the process_creation category can be converted for 4688 with pySigma’s windows-audit pipeline, which maps Image to NewProcessName and ParentImage to ParentProcessName. These rules are written against Sysmon Event ID 1 fields, so conditions on fields that 4688 lacks, such as hashes or OriginalFileName, never match.

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
New Process NameThe full path of the started process
Creator Process NameThe parent (creating) process; available on Windows 10 and later
Process Command LineThe command-line arguments (only when the GPO is enabled)
Subject\Account NameThe account that started the process
Token Elevation TypeThe elevation state (whether an administrator token)

Glossary

  • LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) — abusing legitimate tools already present in the OS. It lets attackers operate without dropping new malware and evades detection more easily.

References