Windows Event ID 4688: A new process has been created
Written every time a new process starts. Because it keeps the executable path, the parent process, and (if configured) the command line, it is one of the most important events for catching attack execution.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Process Creation. It is generated whenever a process is created, recording the new process path (New Process Name), the creating process (Creator Process Name), and the executing account. By default the command-line arguments are not recorded, but enabling the Group Policy “Include command line in process creation events” adds Process Command Line and greatly improves detection capability.
How it is triggered
- Any process start. It appears for applications, scripts, and OS-internal activity alike.
- Command-line recording requires, in addition to Success auditing for Audit Process Creation, enabling
ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled(the GPO above).
Security review points
- Parent-child relationship: detect suspicious launch chains by the pair of
Creator Process Name(parent) andNew Process Name(child). For example,winword.exespawningpowershell.exe, orw3wp.exespawningcmd.exe, are improbable pairs that signal compromise. - LOLBins (living-off-the-land binaries): track abuse of built-in OS tools, such as
certutil.exedownloading files,regsvr32.exerunning remote scripts, and suspicious use ofmshta/rundll32/bitsadmin. - Command line: look in
Process Command Linefor encoded PowerShell (-enc), obfuscation, stealth options like-nop -w hidden, and external URLs. - Also evaluate the executing account and the path (outside standard folders or in a temp folder).
Notes for log review
- Every process start appears, so the volume is enormous. It is unmanageable unless distilled, in a SIEM, into correlation rules using parent-child, command line, and path.
- A blank command line likely means the GPO above is not configured. Confirm the setting as a prerequisite for detection.
- The command line can contain sensitive data such as passwords, so handle it carefully during collection and retention.
- Its role overlaps with EDR and Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation). When both exist, reconcile them; when only 4688 exists, be sure to enable the command-line setting.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1059.001 PowerShell | Execution | PowerShell launched with -enc or -nop -w hidden |
| T1059.003 Windows Command Shell | Execution | cmd.exe spawned from processes such as w3wp.exe |
| T1204.002 Malicious File | Execution | Shells launched from Office documents such as winword.exe |
| T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution | Stealth | Abuse of built-in binaries such as regsvr32 / mshta / rundll32 |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer | Command and Control | File downloads with certutil.exe or bitsadmin |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0202 (T1059.003) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
Microsoft Sentinel has 68 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| CertUtil Used for File Download (Living off the Land) | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| Security Service Registry ACL Modification | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| WMI Spawning Suspicious Child Process (Living off the Land) | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| Base64 encoded Windows process command-lines | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Email access via active sync | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via Remote WMI Execution | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Malware in the recycle bin | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Network endpoint to host executable correlation | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
Other rules (58)
In addition, the 1415 Sigma rules in the process_creation category can be converted for 4688 with pySigma’s windows-audit pipeline, which maps Image to NewProcessName and ParentImage to ParentProcessName. These rules are written against Sysmon Event ID 1 fields, so conditions on fields that 4688 lacks, such as hashes or OriginalFileName, never match.
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
New Process Name | The full path of the started process |
Creator Process Name | The parent (creating) process; available on Windows 10 and later |
Process Command Line | The command-line arguments (only when the GPO is enabled) |
Subject\Account Name | The account that started the process |
Token Elevation Type | The elevation state (whether an administrator token) |
Glossary
- LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) — abusing legitimate tools already present in the OS. It lets attackers operate without dropping new malware and evades detection more easily.