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Windows Event ID 4663: An attempt was made to access an object

Written when an access right is actually exercised on a file, registry, or kernel object. Unlike 4656, which only shows a request, 4663 shows that an operation was “performed,” making it the centerpiece of file/registry auditing.

Overview

The subcategories are Audit File System, Audit Kernel Object, Audit Registry, and Audit Removable Storage. It is generated only if the object’s SACL (the setting that defines which accesses are audited) has a matching audit entry. The difference from 4656 is that 4656 marks the “access requested” stage while 4663 marks “an access right was actually used.” 4663 has no Failure events.

How it is triggered

  • Real access (read, write, delete, and so on) to an audited file, folder, registry key, or removable storage.
  • The exercised rights appear in Accesses / Access Mask. WriteData, Delete, WriteDAC (permission change), and WriteOwner (ownership change) are notable.

Security review points

  • Track reads, writes, and deletes of sensitive files by the triple of target (Object Name), executing account (Subject), and process (Process Name). Emphasize write, delete, and permission-change access in particular.
  • Monitor writes to removable storage (USB and so on) from a data-exfiltration standpoint.
  • Investigate a Process Name outside standard folders or containing a suspicious name like mimikatz. Correlate with the request-stage 4656 and the deletion 4660 to reconstruct the request-to-execution-to-deletion sequence.

Notes for log review

  • It only appears for targets with a SACL set. Auditing everything explodes in volume, so design SACLs narrowly on important assets, sensitive folders, and removable media.
  • Read access occurs in volume during legitimate work. Narrowing to “change” rights such as write, delete, and permission change makes the investigation scope practical.
  • A 4663 on a kernel object has little security meaning and is hard to analyze. Do not audit it without a clear purpose.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1005 Data from Local SystemCollectionReads of sensitive files
T1052.001 Exfiltration over USBExfiltrationWrites to removable storage
T1070.004 File DeletionStealthTrace removal through DELETE access

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategies DET0220 (T1052.001), DET0140 (T1070.004) also list this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 19 and Microsoft Sentinel has 3 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.

RuleTypeSeverity
WCE wceaux.dll AccessSigmaCritical
Suspicious Teams Application Related ObjectAcess EventSigmaHigh
SysKey Registry Keys AccessSigmaHigh
Sysmon Channel Reference DeletionSigmaHigh
Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys AccessSigmaMedium
Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys AccessSigmaMedium
File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive DataSigmaMedium
ISO Image MountedSigmaMedium
LSASS Access From Non System AccountSigmaMedium
Potential Build Process CompromiseSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Other rules (12)

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Object Name / Object TypeThe accessed object and its type
Accesses / Access MaskThe access rights actually exercised
Subject\Account NameThe accessing account
Process NameThe process that performed the access
Handle IDThe key for matching 4656 / 4660

References