Windows Event ID 4663: An attempt was made to access an object
Written when an access right is actually exercised on a file, registry, or kernel object. Unlike 4656, which only shows a request, 4663 shows that an operation was “performed,” making it the centerpiece of file/registry auditing.
Overview
The subcategories are Audit File System, Audit Kernel Object, Audit Registry, and Audit Removable Storage. It is generated only if the object’s SACL (the setting that defines which accesses are audited) has a matching audit entry. The difference from 4656 is that 4656 marks the “access requested” stage while 4663 marks “an access right was actually used.” 4663 has no Failure events.
How it is triggered
- Real access (read, write, delete, and so on) to an audited file, folder, registry key, or removable storage.
- The exercised rights appear in
Accesses/Access Mask.WriteData,Delete,WriteDAC(permission change), andWriteOwner(ownership change) are notable.
Security review points
- Track reads, writes, and deletes of sensitive files by the triple of target (
Object Name), executing account (Subject), and process (Process Name). Emphasize write, delete, and permission-change access in particular. - Monitor writes to removable storage (USB and so on) from a data-exfiltration standpoint.
- Investigate a
Process Nameoutside standard folders or containing a suspicious name likemimikatz. Correlate with the request-stage 4656 and the deletion 4660 to reconstruct the request-to-execution-to-deletion sequence.
Notes for log review
- It only appears for targets with a SACL set. Auditing everything explodes in volume, so design SACLs narrowly on important assets, sensitive folders, and removable media.
- Read access occurs in volume during legitimate work. Narrowing to “change” rights such as write, delete, and permission change makes the investigation scope practical.
- A 4663 on a kernel object has little security meaning and is hard to analyze. Do not audit it without a clear purpose.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1005 Data from Local System | Collection | Reads of sensitive files |
| T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB | Exfiltration | Writes to removable storage |
| T1070.004 File Deletion | Stealth | Trace removal through DELETE access |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategies DET0220 (T1052.001), DET0140 (T1070.004) also list this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 19 and Microsoft Sentinel has 3 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| WCE wceaux.dll Access | Sigma | Critical |
| Suspicious Teams Application Related ObjectAcess Event | Sigma | High |
| SysKey Registry Keys Access | Sigma | High |
| Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion | Sigma | High |
| Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access | Sigma | Medium |
| Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access | Sigma | Medium |
| File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data | Sigma | Medium |
| ISO Image Mounted | Sigma | Medium |
| LSASS Access From Non System Account | Sigma | Medium |
| Potential Build Process Compromise | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
Other rules (12)
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Secure Deletion with SDelete | Sigma | Medium |
| Potentially Suspicious AccessMask Requested From LSASS | Sigma | Medium |
| Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam | Sigma | Medium |
| Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Key - Write Access Requested | Sigma | Medium |
| Service Registry Key Read Access Request | Sigma | Low |
| CVE-2023-23397 Exploitation Attempt | Sigma (threat-specific) | Critical |
| CVE-2024-1708 - ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploitation - Security | Sigma (threat-specific) | Critical |
| BlueSky Ransomware Artefacts | Sigma (threat-specific) | High |
| Identify SysAid Server web shell creation | Sentinel (threat-specific) | High |
| ScreenConnect User Database Modification - Security | Sigma (threat-specific) | Medium |
| Access To Browser Credential Files By Uncommon Applications - Security | Sigma (hunting) | Low |
| File Created In Startup Folder | Sentinel hunting query | - |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Object Name / Object Type | The accessed object and its type |
Accesses / Access Mask | The access rights actually exercised |
Subject\Account Name | The accessing account |
Process Name | The process that performed the access |
Handle ID | The key for matching 4656 / 4660 |