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Windows Event ID 4662: An operation was performed on an object

Written when an operation is performed on an Active Directory object. It is a cornerstone of AD monitoring, usable to detect DCSync (an attack that steals domain credentials via a replication request).

Overview

The subcategory is Audit Directory Service Access. It is generated only if an appropriate SACL is set on the target AD object and the performed operation matches that audit condition. If the operation fails, a Failure event is produced. One event is generated per operation type. The key to reading it is the Properties field, which lists the GUIDs of the accessed attributes or extended rights.

How it is triggered

  • When an audited operation, such as reading, writing, or exercising an extended right on an AD object, is performed.
  • It is generated on domain controllers.

Security review points

  • DCSync detection: an attacker abuses GetNCChanges of the MS-DRSR (directory replication) protocol to impersonate a DC and request replication of credentials. This is run by tools like mimikatz’s lsadump::dcsync. Suspect DCSync if 4662 requests these extended-right GUIDs:
    • 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes)
    • 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)
  • The key is that the subject is not a machine account (ending in $). Legitimate DC-to-DC replication uses machine accounts, so a user account requesting these rights is highly suspicious. The AccessMask is typically 0x100 (control access).
  • Together with handle request 4661, track reconnaissance and attribute access against AD.

Notes for log review

  • DCs produce these in volume from legitimate operations and replication. They are unusable raw; the event only works as DCSync detection once narrowed by conditions like “replication GUID + non-machine account.”
  • Reading the Properties GUIDs directly is heavy. Maintain a dictionary of GUIDs of interest (such as the replication rights above) and match against it.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1003.006 DCSyncCredential AccessDS-Replication-Get-Changes(-All) requested by a non-machine account
T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscoveryBroad access to AD object attributes

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0594 (T1003.006) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 7 and Microsoft Sentinel has 2 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.

RuleTypeSeverity
Active Directory Replication from Non Machine AccountSigmaCritical
AD Object WriteDAC AccessSigmaCritical
DPAPI Domain Backup Key ExtractionSigmaHigh
Mimikatz DC SyncSigmaHigh
Non Domain Controller Active Directory ReplicationSentinel analytics ruleHigh
Potential Kerberos Coercion by Spoofing SPNs via DNS ManipulationSigmaHigh
ADFS DKM Master Key ExportSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Potential AD User Enumeration From Non-Machine AccountSigmaMedium
WMI Persistence - SecuritySigmaMedium

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Subject\Account NameThe account that performed the operation; a non-$ user is notable
Object ServerDS (directory service)
PropertiesThe GUIDs of accessed attributes / extended rights
Access MaskThe access performed; 0x100 is control access

Glossary

  • DCSync — an attack that abuses domain controller replication to steal password hashes and other data from other DCs via a replication request.

References