Windows Event ID 4662: An operation was performed on an object
Written when an operation is performed on an Active Directory object. It is a cornerstone of AD monitoring, usable to detect DCSync (an attack that steals domain credentials via a replication request).
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Directory Service Access. It is generated only if an appropriate SACL is set on the target AD object and the performed operation matches that audit condition. If the operation fails, a Failure event is produced. One event is generated per operation type. The key to reading it is the Properties field, which lists the GUIDs of the accessed attributes or extended rights.
How it is triggered
- When an audited operation, such as reading, writing, or exercising an extended right on an AD object, is performed.
- It is generated on domain controllers.
Security review points
- DCSync detection: an attacker abuses
GetNCChangesof the MS-DRSR (directory replication) protocol to impersonate a DC and request replication of credentials. This is run by tools likemimikatz’slsadump::dcsync. Suspect DCSync if 4662 requests these extended-right GUIDs:1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2(DS-Replication-Get-Changes)1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2(DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)
- The key is that the subject is not a machine account (ending in
$). Legitimate DC-to-DC replication uses machine accounts, so a user account requesting these rights is highly suspicious. TheAccessMaskis typically0x100(control access). - Together with handle request 4661, track reconnaissance and attribute access against AD.
Notes for log review
- DCs produce these in volume from legitimate operations and replication. They are unusable raw; the event only works as DCSync detection once narrowed by conditions like “replication GUID + non-machine account.”
- Reading the
PropertiesGUIDs directly is heavy. Maintain a dictionary of GUIDs of interest (such as the replication rights above) and match against it.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1003.006 DCSync | Credential Access | DS-Replication-Get-Changes(-All) requested by a non-machine account |
| T1087.002 Domain Account | Discovery | Broad access to AD object attributes |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0594 (T1003.006) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 7 and Microsoft Sentinel has 2 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account | Sigma | Critical |
| AD Object WriteDAC Access | Sigma | Critical |
| DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction | Sigma | High |
| Mimikatz DC Sync | Sigma | High |
| Non Domain Controller Active Directory Replication | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| Potential Kerberos Coercion by Spoofing SPNs via DNS Manipulation | Sigma | High |
| ADFS DKM Master Key Export | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Potential AD User Enumeration From Non-Machine Account | Sigma | Medium |
| WMI Persistence - Security | Sigma | Medium |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Subject\Account Name | The account that performed the operation; a non-$ user is notable |
Object Server | DS (directory service) |
Properties | The GUIDs of accessed attributes / extended rights |
Access Mask | The access performed; 0x100 is control access |
Glossary
- DCSync — an attack that abuses domain controller replication to steal password hashes and other data from other DCs via a replication request.