Windows Event ID 4657: A registry value was modified
Written when a registry “value” is modified. Because it keeps the before and after values plus the process, it is effective for tracking persistence and configuration tampering.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Registry. It is generated when a registry key’s value is modified (not when the key itself is modified). It is recorded only if the target key’s SACL has “Set Value” auditing set. The old value (OldValue), new value (NewValue), and executing process are kept, which helps investigation.
How it is triggered
- When the value of an audited registry key is created, modified, or deleted.
- Whether via
regedit.exe,reg.exe, or various APIs, it is recorded as long as it matches theSACL.
Security review points
- Set SACLs on keys commonly targeted for persistence and defense evasion (the autostart
Runkeys, service definitions,Image File Execution Options, and the LSAAuthentication Packages/Notification Packages), and catch value changes with 4657. - Check whether
NewValuecontains a suspicious executable path or script, and whetherProcess Nameis unexpected.
Notes for log review
- The registry sees a great deal of legitimate updating. Auditing every key is impractical; it only becomes usable once SACLs are narrowed to important keys.
- Since before and after values are recorded, read by the difference (from what to what). Distinguish legitimate configuration changes (patches, GPO application).
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Changes to autostart values such as the Run key |
| T1543.003 Windows Service | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Rewrites of service definitions (such as ImagePath) |
| T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | Values added under Image File Execution Options |
| T1112 Modify Registry | Defense Impairment, Persistence | Tampering with defense- or authentication-related values such as LSA Authentication Packages / Notification Packages |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategy DET0422 (T1546.012) also lists this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 5 and Microsoft Sentinel has 6 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry | Sigma | High |
| NetNTLM Downgrade Attack | Sigma | High |
| Scheduled Task Hide | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion | Sigma | High |
| COM Registry Key Modified to Point to File in Color Profile Folder | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Potential Fodhelper UAC Bypass | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam | Sigma | Medium |
| Windows Defender Exclusion List Modified | Sigma | Medium |
| Known Nylon Typhoon Registry modifications patterns | Sentinel (threat-specific) | Medium |
| Persisting via IFEO Registry Key | Sentinel hunting query | Medium |
Other rules (1)
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Crash dump disabled on host | Sentinel hunting query | - |
In addition, the 268 Sigma rules in the registry_set / registry_event / registry_add categories can be converted for 4657 with pySigma’s windows-audit pipeline, which maps Image to ProcessName and TargetObject to ObjectName. Rules that use EventType, NewName, or User fail to convert because 4657 has no matching field.
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Object Name / Object Value Name | The target key and value name |
Old Value / New Value | The values before and after |
Process Name | The process that made the change |
Subject\Account Name | The executing account |