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Windows Event ID 4656: A handle to an object was requested

Written when specific access rights are requested for a file, registry, or kernel object. It shows whether the request was granted, but not that the operation was actually performed.

Overview

The subcategories are Audit File System, Audit Kernel Object, Audit Registry, and Audit Removable Storage. It is generated only if the object’s SACL (System Access Control List: the setting that defines which accesses are audited) has a matching audit entry. If access is denied, a Failure event is produced. You learn the result of the request, but check 4663 to confirm the operation was actually carried out.

How it is triggered

  • A request to open (obtain a handle to) a file, folder, or registry key configured for auditing.
  • The requested rights appear in AccessMask / AccessList (read, write, delete, and so on).

Security review points

  • Check the source (Subject) and process (Process Name) of access requests to sensitive files or registry keys. Failure (denied) events in particular are a sign that an account without permission tried to touch something.
  • Infer intent from which rights were requested (AccessMask). Requests for delete, write, or take-ownership are higher priority.
  • Since this is the “request” stage, follow the request-to-execution flow by combining it with the actual-operation 4663 and the deletion 4660.

Notes for log review

  • It only appears for targets with a SACL set. Without narrowing the audited targets it becomes enormous; narrow too far and you see nothing. The design assumes SACLs only on important assets.
  • Handle acquisition appears in volume ahead of real access. Read-only access and known legitimate processes tend to be noise, so filter by target and rights.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential AccessHandle requests to the LSASS process (requires a SACL on LSASS and the matching audit setting)
T1005 Data from Local SystemCollectionAccess requests to sensitive files and registry keys that have a SACL

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 14 and Microsoft Sentinel has 1 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.

RuleTypeSeverity
WCE wceaux.dll AccessSigmaCritical
Password Dumper Activity on LSASSSigmaHigh
SAM Registry Hive Handle RequestSigmaHigh
SysKey Registry Keys AccessSigmaHigh
Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys AccessSigmaMedium
Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys AccessSigmaMedium
LSASS Access From Non System AccountSigmaMedium
Potential Secure Deletion with SDeleteSigmaMedium
Potentially Suspicious AccessMask Requested From LSASSSigmaMedium
Processes Accessing the Microphone and WebcamSigmaMedium
Other rules (5)

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Subject\Account NameThe requesting account
Object Name / Object TypeThe target object and its type
Accesses / Access MaskThe requested access rights
Process NameThe requesting process

Glossary

  • SACL (System Access Control List) — the setting on an object that defines which accesses are written to the audit log. Without it, access events are not recorded.

References