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Windows Event ID 4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials

Written when an account attempts a logon by explicitly specifying another account’s credentials. Because it captures “impersonate someone else” actions like runas or PsExec, it is a heavily-used event for detecting lateral movement.

Overview

The subcategory is Audit Logon. It is generated when a process attempts a logon while explicitly specifying the target account’s credentials. It is typical of batch-style configurations such as scheduled tasks and of the RUNAS command, while it also has a routine side, occurring periodically during normal OS activity. The key point is that it records both “who (Subject)” and “whose credentials were used (Account Whose Credentials Were Used).”

How it is triggered

  • Running a process as another account with runas.
  • Connections involving explicit credentials, via scheduled tasks (SchTasks), PsExec, WinRM, SMB, and so on.
  • It is also recorded when password spraying is run on that machine.

Security review points

  • Attackers heavily use this action for lateral movement (spreading to other machines after intrusion). Using stolen credentials with runas / PsExec leaves a 4648, making it a strong lead for lateral movement.
  • Focus on the pairing of Subject\Security ID (who acted) and Account Whose Credentials Were Used (the owner of the credentials used). If a subject that should not know or use those credentials is using them, it is suspicious.
  • Investigate a Process Name outside standard folders or containing a suspicious name such as mimikatz. A Network Address outside the internal allowed-IP list deserves attention. A burst of 4648 on a workstation in a short time (say, more than 100 in one minute) suggests spraying or automation.
  • It can be correlated with the 4624 of the same session and with Kerberos 4769 via Logon GUID.

Notes for log review

  • It occurs routinely with legitimate automation such as scheduled tasks and services, so baseline out and exclude those aimed at localhost (::1 / 127.0.0.1) or driven by known legitimate processes.
  • The high-value cases are “a hands-on runas / remote execution that used another account’s credentials.” Narrow down by the three points of source, executing process, and the account used.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1078 Valid AccountsStealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial AccessLogons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec
T1021 Remote ServicesLateral MovementLateral movement that uses another account’s credentials to connect to other hosts
T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential AccessBursts on a workstation suggest spraying or automation

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategies DET0269 (T1021), DET0487 (T1110.003) also list this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 1 and Microsoft Sentinel has 3 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition.

RuleTypeSeverity
Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit CredentialsSigmaMedium
Multiple Explicit Credential Usage - 4648 eventsSentinel hunting query-
TI Map File Entity to Security EventSentinel hunting query-
EatonForeseer - Unauthorized LoginsSentinel (needs setup)High

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Subject\Account NameThe account that performed the action
Account Whose Credentials Were UsedThe owner of the credentials actually used
Target Server NameThe destination server; localhost if local
Process NameThe process run with explicit credentials
Network Address / PortThe source of the attempt

References