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Windows Event ID 4625: An account failed to log on

Written for any logon failure. Reading the failure reason code and the pattern of occurrences makes it a key event for detecting authentication attacks such as brute force and password spraying.

Overview

The subcategories are Audit Account Lockout and Audit Logon. It is generated on the machine where the logon was attempted, on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations alike. Why it failed shows in the Status / Sub Status reason codes, and which method was used shows in LogonType. It is the counterpart to the success event 4624.

How it is triggered

  • A logon attempt with a wrong password, or against a nonexistent, disabled, or locked account.
  • Failures over the network (LogonType 3), interactive (2), RDP (10), and so on.
  • The reason is distinguished by Status/Sub Status codes. Common ones:
    • 0xC0000064 nonexistent user name (a sign of username enumeration)
    • 0xC000006A wrong password (an attempt against an existing user)
    • 0xC0000072 disabled account
    • 0xC0000234 locked-out account
    • 0xC000006F logon outside permitted hours / 0xC0000070 logon from an unauthorized workstation

Security review points

  • Brute force: many failures against a single account from a single source in a short time. Detect by threshold, for example more than 50 in one minute.
  • Password spraying: a few attempts each against many accounts from one source (MITRE ATT&CK T1110.003). Failures per account are low but anomalous across the set. Spraying over SMB leaves 4625 on the DC, but over LDAP or Kerberos a 4625 may not appear, in which case 4771 (Kerberos pre-authentication failure) must also be watched.
  • A Process Name outside standard folders, or containing a suspicious name like mimikatz, warrants investigation. A mismatch between LogonType and the account (such as an administrator failing with Batch/Service) is another focus.

Notes for log review

  • A single failure is everyday (a mistyped password). Look at the “same source, short time, many” pattern rather than the raw count.
  • Aggregating by source IP, workstation name, target account, and reason code helps separate brute force from spraying.
  • Attacks over LDAP/Kerberos surface poorly in 4625. Do not rely on 4625 alone; combine it with Kerberos logs (4771 / 4768) and NTLM validation 4776.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1110.001 Password GuessingCredential AccessMany failures against one account in a short time
T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential AccessA few failures each against many accounts from one source

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategies DET0551 (T1110.001), DET0487 (T1110.003) also list this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 7 and Microsoft Sentinel has 17 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.

RuleTypeSeverity
Hacktool RulerSigmaHigh
Metasploit SMB AuthenticationSigmaHigh
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon ReasonsSigmaMedium
Failed host logons but success logon to AzureADSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Failed Logon From Public IPSigmaMedium
Potential Remote Desktop TunnelingSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Excessive Windows Logon FailuresSentinel analytics ruleLow
Failed logon attempts by valid accounts within 10 minsSentinel analytics ruleLow
SecurityEvent - Multiple authentication failures followed by a successSentinel analytics ruleLow
Scanner PoC for CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE VulnSigma (threat-specific)High
Other rules (14)
RuleTypeSeverity
Remote Login Performed with WMISentinel hunting queryLow
Decoy User Account Authentication AttemptSentinel hunting query-
Failed Login Attempt by Expired accountSentinel hunting query-
Fake computer account authentication attemptSentinel hunting query-
Hosts with new logonsSentinel hunting query-
RID HijackingSentinel hunting query-
Summary of failed user logons by reason of failureSentinel hunting query-
Summary of user logons by logon typeSentinel hunting query-
Suspicious Windows Login Outside Normal HoursSentinel hunting query-
Tracking Privileged Account Rare ActivitySentinel hunting query-
VIP account more than 6 failed logons in 10Sentinel hunting query-
EatonForeseer - Unauthorized LoginsSentinel (needs setup)High
Interactive Logon to Server SystemsSigma (needs setup)Medium
Potential Pass the Hash ActivitySigma (needs setup)Medium

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Account For Which Logon Failed\Account NameThe targeted account
Status / Sub StatusThe failure reason code; used to infer the attack type
LogonTypeThe logon kind (2/3/10, etc.)
Source Network Address / Workstation NameThe source of the attempt; aggregation axes
Authentication PackageNTLM / Kerberos / Negotiate

References