Windows Event ID 4625: An account failed to log on
Written for any logon failure. Reading the failure reason code and the pattern of occurrences makes it a key event for detecting authentication attacks such as brute force and password spraying.
Overview
The subcategories are Audit Account Lockout and Audit Logon. It is generated on the machine where the logon was attempted, on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations alike. Why it failed shows in the Status / Sub Status reason codes, and which method was used shows in LogonType. It is the counterpart to the success event 4624.
How it is triggered
- A logon attempt with a wrong password, or against a nonexistent, disabled, or locked account.
- Failures over the network (
LogonType 3), interactive (2), RDP (10), and so on. - The reason is distinguished by
Status/Sub Statuscodes. Common ones:0xC0000064nonexistent user name (a sign of username enumeration)0xC000006Awrong password (an attempt against an existing user)0xC0000072disabled account0xC0000234locked-out account0xC000006Flogon outside permitted hours /0xC0000070logon from an unauthorized workstation
Security review points
- Brute force: many failures against a single account from a single source in a short time. Detect by threshold, for example more than 50 in one minute.
- Password spraying: a few attempts each against many accounts from one source (MITRE ATT&CK
T1110.003). Failures per account are low but anomalous across the set. Spraying over SMB leaves 4625 on the DC, but over LDAP or Kerberos a 4625 may not appear, in which case 4771 (Kerberos pre-authentication failure) must also be watched. - A
Process Nameoutside standard folders, or containing a suspicious name likemimikatz, warrants investigation. A mismatch betweenLogonTypeand the account (such as an administrator failing with Batch/Service) is another focus.
Notes for log review
- A single failure is everyday (a mistyped password). Look at the “same source, short time, many” pattern rather than the raw count.
- Aggregating by source IP, workstation name, target account, and reason code helps separate brute force from spraying.
- Attacks over LDAP/Kerberos surface poorly in 4625. Do not rely on 4625 alone; combine it with Kerberos logs (4771 / 4768) and NTLM validation 4776.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1110.001 Password Guessing | Credential Access | Many failures against one account in a short time |
| T1110.003 Password Spraying | Credential Access | A few failures each against many accounts from one source |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategies DET0551 (T1110.001), DET0487 (T1110.003) also list this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 7 and Microsoft Sentinel has 17 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Hacktool Ruler | Sigma | High |
| Metasploit SMB Authentication | Sigma | High |
| Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons | Sigma | Medium |
| Failed host logons but success logon to AzureAD | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Failed Logon From Public IP | Sigma | Medium |
| Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling | Sentinel analytics rule | Medium |
| Excessive Windows Logon Failures | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| Failed logon attempts by valid accounts within 10 mins | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| SecurityEvent - Multiple authentication failures followed by a success | Sentinel analytics rule | Low |
| Scanner PoC for CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE Vuln | Sigma (threat-specific) | High |
Other rules (14)
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Remote Login Performed with WMI | Sentinel hunting query | Low |
| Decoy User Account Authentication Attempt | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Failed Login Attempt by Expired account | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Fake computer account authentication attempt | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Hosts with new logons | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| RID Hijacking | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Summary of failed user logons by reason of failure | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Summary of user logons by logon type | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Suspicious Windows Login Outside Normal Hours | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| Tracking Privileged Account Rare Activity | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| VIP account more than 6 failed logons in 10 | Sentinel hunting query | - |
| EatonForeseer - Unauthorized Logins | Sentinel (needs setup) | High |
| Interactive Logon to Server Systems | Sigma (needs setup) | Medium |
| Potential Pass the Hash Activity | Sigma (needs setup) | Medium |
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Account For Which Logon Failed\Account Name | The targeted account |
Status / Sub Status | The failure reason code; used to infer the attack type |
LogonType | The logon kind (2/3/10, etc.) |
Source Network Address / Workstation Name | The source of the attempt; aggregation axes |
Authentication Package | NTLM / Kerberos / Negotiate |