Windows Event ID 4624: An account was successfully logged on
The record of a successful authentication, written when a logon session (the span from when a user starts using a machine until they finish) is created on the destination host. It is by far the most common event in the Windows Security log, so without a clear way to read it, the signal drowns in noise.
Overview
The subcategory is Audit Logon. The event is generated on the machine that was accessed, where the session was created, not on the device the person is sitting at. Who logged on, from where, and by what method is read from the combination of LogonType (the kind of logon), AuthenticationPackageName (the authentication method), and IpAddress (the source IP). Newer builds (Windows 10 and later) added fields such as ElevatedToken (whether the session runs with administrator rights), which help describe privilege elevation and remote administration.
How it is triggered
The “kind” of logon appears in the LogonType number, and that is the starting point of any investigation. A sign-in at the console is 2, file sharing or remote management is 3, and Remote Desktop is 10: the same “successful logon” means very different things depending on the value. The full list of values and what produces them is in the logon types table below.
In steady state, most entries are automatic logons where SubjectUserSid (the SID of the reporting account) is S-1-5-18, the built-in SYSTEM account (an internal OS account, not a person). Human and remote logons are recorded amid this volume of automatic activity, so the noise filtering and correlation (cross-checking several logs) described below are prerequisites.
Logon types
All values that can appear in LogonType. 1 is undefined and 6 (Proxy) is defined but unused, so neither shows up in 4624.
| Value | Name | What happened | Common sources | What to look for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
0 | System | A logon used only by the SYSTEM account | OS startup | Rarely matters in an investigation |
2 | Interactive | Someone signed in at the machine’s console | Console sign-in, runas, lights-out management cards, network KVM (remote keyboard/video/mouse) | Interactive logons to servers should be rare. For admin accounts, match them against change records |
3 | Network | Access over the network | SMB (Windows file sharing), net use, PsExec (a tool that runs commands on a remote host), WinRM (Windows remote management), remote MMC consoles, vulnerability scanners | By far the most common value, and the main one for spotting lateral movement |
4 | Batch | A process ran on a user’s behalf without them | Task Scheduler tasks set to “Run whether user is logged on or not” | Review together with new task registrations in 4698 |
5 | Service | A service started under a configured account | The Service Control Manager (the OS component that starts and stops services) | Starts as SYSTEM / LOCAL SERVICE / NETWORK SERVICE are constant background noise. Services running as domain users are few, so keep a list and unfamiliar ones stand out. New service installs appear in 4697 |
7 | Unlock | The screen lock was released | Returning from the lock screen | Useful for estimating when someone was at the desk. Failed unlocks appear in 4625 |
8 | NetworkCleartext | A network logon where the password reached the authentication package unhashed | IIS (the Windows web server) Basic authentication, PowerShell with CredSSP (an authentication method that delegates credentials to the remote host) | The wire is not necessarily plaintext, but the destination received the password. If it appears on a server where you do not expect it, check that path |
9 | NewCredentials | The current logon stays as is, but a different account is used only for outbound connections | runas /netonly | Shows up in normal admin work too. For abuse by attack tools, see Security review points |
10 | RemoteInteractive | Remote operation over Remote Desktop | RDP (Remote Desktop) | The source is in IpAddress. If Restricted Admin Mode is Yes, credentials were not sent to the destination |
11 | CachedInteractive | Signed in with credentials cached on the device, without contacting a domain controller | Domain-joined laptops signing in off-network without VPN | Normal for laptops. On a server that always sits on the corporate network, check its connectivity to the domain controllers |
12 | CachedRemoteInteractive | The same remote operation as 10, distinguished for internal auditing | Rare | Read it the same way as 10 |
13 | CachedUnlock | The screen lock was released with cached credentials | Unlocking off-network | Read it the same way as 11 |
The logon type also decides whether credentials are left behind on the destination. Per Microsoft’s reference, logons of type 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10 leave password hashes and authentication tickets in the destination’s memory, where they can be reused to reach other machines if that host is compromised. Type 3 does not. For 4 and 5, the password is also written to disk as an LSA secret (a storage area the OS encrypts). A record of a privileged account logging on to an ordinary workstation or server with type 2 or 10 should be read as a record of credential exposure.
Security review points
Post-intrusion lateral movement (spreading the compromise from the first machine to others on the network) and the abuse of stolen credentials are the main things this event reveals.
- Spread of network logons: if a single account logs on to several hosts with
LogonType 3in a short window, suspect lateral movement over file sharing or remote management. A service account (an account for programs, not people) that usually runs a fixed task but suddenly logs on withLogonType 3from an unfamiliar source also deserves attention. - NTLM network logons:
LogonType 3together withAuthenticationPackageNameofNTLM (the older Windows authentication protocol)is the classic landing point forpass-the-hash (an attack that authenticates using a stolen password hash, without ever knowing the plaintext password). Review it alongside 4776 on the same machine and 5140 for share access. LogonType 9(NewCredentials): a 4624 withLogonProcessNameofseclogoandAuthenticationPackageNameofNegotiatematches the behavior of overpass-the-hash (an evolution of pass-the-hash) produced byMimikatz (a well-known credential-theft tool). Correlate it with 4648, which marks the explicit use of another account’s credentials.- Privilege and target: combine
ElevatedTokenset toYes(an elevated administrator session) and 4672 (special privileges assigned) to track high-privilege accounts.Kerberos (the default Windows authentication protocol)ticket requests 4768 / 4769 can be tied to this event throughLogonGuid(an identifier assigned to the logon). - Contextual anomalies: logons outside business hours, unexpected source IPs, and success on accounts that should never be used (disabled or guest accounts) are worth investigating even on their own.
Notes for log review
Used as-is in a detection rule, this event produces a mountain of false positives (alerts that fire when nothing is actually wrong), so understand the sources of noise first.
DWM-*(the internal process that draws the screen),UMFD-*(the internal font process), andSYSTEMautomatic logons appear in huge numbers. The standard practice is to put them on an exclusion list and drop them up front.- An
IpAddressof::1or127.0.0.1means a logon from the machine itself (the loopback address); distinguish it from external remote access. - A blank source field is not necessarily an anomaly; it is by design. Kerberos network logons often leave the workstation name empty, and NTLM does not carry the IP or port details. Only what
LSASS (the core Windows process that handles authentication)received from the authenticating service is recorded. - Domain controllers (the servers that handle authentication for the whole network) and file servers generate enormous volumes. Do not judge on a single 4624; accuracy comes only when you chain multiple events over time, for example “logon from an unfamiliar IP, then access to sensitive files within a few minutes.”
- Know the “normal combinations” of account, source, and logon type in advance (baselining) and watch for deviations from them. This is the practical approach.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | Tactic | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1078 Valid Accounts | Stealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | Legitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead |
| T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol | Lateral Movement | LogonType 10 (RDP) logons |
| T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Lateral Movement | Spread of LogonType 3 logons via shares and remote administration |
| T1550.002 Pass the Hash | Lateral Movement | LogonType 3 with NTLM, or LogonType 9 with seclogo (overpass-the-hash) |
Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategies DET0560 (T1078), DET0327 (T1021.001), DET0530 (T1021.002) also list this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.
Detection rules
SigmaHQ has 17 and Microsoft Sentinel has 21 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.
| Rule | Type | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| DiagTrackEoP Default Login Username | Sigma | Critical |
| External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP | Sigma | High |
| Hacktool Ruler | Sigma | High |
| Metasploit SMB Authentication | Sigma | High |
| Non Domain Controller Active Directory Replication | Sentinel analytics rule | High |
| Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP | Sigma | High |
| RDP Login from Localhost | Sigma | High |
| RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern | Sigma | High |
| Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt | Sigma | High |
| External Remote RDP Logon from Public IP | Sigma | Medium |
Other rules (28)
Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.
Key fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
Subject\Security ID | The account that requested the logon. SYSTEM (S-1-5-18) for local processing and NULL SID (S-1-0-0) for network logons are normal. Any other account means a process running as that account requested the logon, so read it together with Process Name |
Subject\Logon ID | The session ID of the requester. 0x3E7 is the SYSTEM session. 0x0 means the requester has no session and comes paired with NULL SID; it is entirely normal for network logons (type 3) and is not an anomaly by itself |
New Logon\Security ID / Account Name | The account that actually logged on. The main subject of monitoring |
New Logon\Logon ID | The ID of the new session. The same value appears in logoff events 4634 / 4647, special privileges 4672, and process creation 4688, so use it to tie a session together from start to finish |
Linked Logon ID | The ID of the paired session. With UAC (which runs even administrators with restricted rights by default) enabled, an administrator sign-in creates two sessions, one restricted and one elevated, each carrying the other’s ID. 0x0 when there is no pair |
LogonType | Logon kind. See the logon types table for each value |
Authentication Package | Kerberos / NTLM / Negotiate. Heavy NTLM use is an investigative lead |
Workstation Name / Source Network Address / Source Port | The logon source. May be blank depending on the protocol |
Elevated Token | Yes means a session elevated to administrator rights |
Logon Process / Process Name | The process that produced the logon. Values like seclogo help infer the technique |
Glossary
- SID — a unique identification number assigned to each account or group. It pays to memorize common values such as
S-1-5-18for SYSTEM. - Service account — an account created to run programs or services, rather than for a person to use.
- Correlation — cross-checking several logs to reconstruct a sequence of activity that a single event cannot show.
- Baseline — recording the normal state in advance and using it as the reference for anomaly detection.
References
- Microsoft Learn: 4624(S) An account was successfully logged on.
- Microsoft Learn: Administrative tools and logon types reference
- Ultimate Windows Security: Event ID 4624
- Event Log Explorer: Logon type – what does it mean?
- SigmaHQ: Successful Overpass the Hash (logon type 9)
- CyberArk: Detecting Pass-the-Hash with Windows Event Viewer