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Windows Event ID 4624: An account was successfully logged on

The record of a successful authentication, written when a logon session (the span from when a user starts using a machine until they finish) is created on the destination host. It is by far the most common event in the Windows Security log, so without a clear way to read it, the signal drowns in noise.

Overview

The subcategory is Audit Logon. The event is generated on the machine that was accessed, where the session was created, not on the device the person is sitting at. Who logged on, from where, and by what method is read from the combination of LogonType (the kind of logon), AuthenticationPackageName (the authentication method), and IpAddress (the source IP). Newer builds (Windows 10 and later) added fields such as ElevatedToken (whether the session runs with administrator rights), which help describe privilege elevation and remote administration.

How it is triggered

The “kind” of logon appears in the LogonType number, and that is the starting point of any investigation. A sign-in at the console is 2, file sharing or remote management is 3, and Remote Desktop is 10: the same “successful logon” means very different things depending on the value. The full list of values and what produces them is in the logon types table below.

In steady state, most entries are automatic logons where SubjectUserSid (the SID of the reporting account) is S-1-5-18, the built-in SYSTEM account (an internal OS account, not a person). Human and remote logons are recorded amid this volume of automatic activity, so the noise filtering and correlation (cross-checking several logs) described below are prerequisites.

Logon types

All values that can appear in LogonType. 1 is undefined and 6 (Proxy) is defined but unused, so neither shows up in 4624.

ValueNameWhat happenedCommon sourcesWhat to look for
0SystemA logon used only by the SYSTEM accountOS startupRarely matters in an investigation
2InteractiveSomeone signed in at the machine’s consoleConsole sign-in, runas, lights-out management cards, network KVM (remote keyboard/video/mouse)Interactive logons to servers should be rare. For admin accounts, match them against change records
3NetworkAccess over the networkSMB (Windows file sharing), net use, PsExec (a tool that runs commands on a remote host), WinRM (Windows remote management), remote MMC consoles, vulnerability scannersBy far the most common value, and the main one for spotting lateral movement
4BatchA process ran on a user’s behalf without themTask Scheduler tasks set to “Run whether user is logged on or not”Review together with new task registrations in 4698
5ServiceA service started under a configured accountThe Service Control Manager (the OS component that starts and stops services)Starts as SYSTEM / LOCAL SERVICE / NETWORK SERVICE are constant background noise. Services running as domain users are few, so keep a list and unfamiliar ones stand out. New service installs appear in 4697
7UnlockThe screen lock was releasedReturning from the lock screenUseful for estimating when someone was at the desk. Failed unlocks appear in 4625
8NetworkCleartextA network logon where the password reached the authentication package unhashedIIS (the Windows web server) Basic authentication, PowerShell with CredSSP (an authentication method that delegates credentials to the remote host)The wire is not necessarily plaintext, but the destination received the password. If it appears on a server where you do not expect it, check that path
9NewCredentialsThe current logon stays as is, but a different account is used only for outbound connectionsrunas /netonlyShows up in normal admin work too. For abuse by attack tools, see Security review points
10RemoteInteractiveRemote operation over Remote DesktopRDP (Remote Desktop)The source is in IpAddress. If Restricted Admin Mode is Yes, credentials were not sent to the destination
11CachedInteractiveSigned in with credentials cached on the device, without contacting a domain controllerDomain-joined laptops signing in off-network without VPNNormal for laptops. On a server that always sits on the corporate network, check its connectivity to the domain controllers
12CachedRemoteInteractiveThe same remote operation as 10, distinguished for internal auditingRareRead it the same way as 10
13CachedUnlockThe screen lock was released with cached credentialsUnlocking off-networkRead it the same way as 11

The logon type also decides whether credentials are left behind on the destination. Per Microsoft’s reference, logons of type 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10 leave password hashes and authentication tickets in the destination’s memory, where they can be reused to reach other machines if that host is compromised. Type 3 does not. For 4 and 5, the password is also written to disk as an LSA secret (a storage area the OS encrypts). A record of a privileged account logging on to an ordinary workstation or server with type 2 or 10 should be read as a record of credential exposure.

Security review points

Post-intrusion lateral movement (spreading the compromise from the first machine to others on the network) and the abuse of stolen credentials are the main things this event reveals.

  • Spread of network logons: if a single account logs on to several hosts with LogonType 3 in a short window, suspect lateral movement over file sharing or remote management. A service account (an account for programs, not people) that usually runs a fixed task but suddenly logs on with LogonType 3 from an unfamiliar source also deserves attention.
  • NTLM network logons: LogonType 3 together with AuthenticationPackageName of NTLM (the older Windows authentication protocol) is the classic landing point for pass-the-hash (an attack that authenticates using a stolen password hash, without ever knowing the plaintext password). Review it alongside 4776 on the same machine and 5140 for share access.
  • LogonType 9 (NewCredentials): a 4624 with LogonProcessName of seclogo and AuthenticationPackageName of Negotiate matches the behavior of overpass-the-hash (an evolution of pass-the-hash) produced by Mimikatz (a well-known credential-theft tool). Correlate it with 4648, which marks the explicit use of another account’s credentials.
  • Privilege and target: combine ElevatedToken set to Yes (an elevated administrator session) and 4672 (special privileges assigned) to track high-privilege accounts. Kerberos (the default Windows authentication protocol) ticket requests 4768 / 4769 can be tied to this event through LogonGuid (an identifier assigned to the logon).
  • Contextual anomalies: logons outside business hours, unexpected source IPs, and success on accounts that should never be used (disabled or guest accounts) are worth investigating even on their own.

Notes for log review

Used as-is in a detection rule, this event produces a mountain of false positives (alerts that fire when nothing is actually wrong), so understand the sources of noise first.

  • DWM-* (the internal process that draws the screen), UMFD-* (the internal font process), and SYSTEM automatic logons appear in huge numbers. The standard practice is to put them on an exclusion list and drop them up front.
  • An IpAddress of ::1 or 127.0.0.1 means a logon from the machine itself (the loopback address); distinguish it from external remote access.
  • A blank source field is not necessarily an anomaly; it is by design. Kerberos network logons often leave the workstation name empty, and NTLM does not carry the IP or port details. Only what LSASS (the core Windows process that handles authentication) received from the authenticating service is recorded.
  • Domain controllers (the servers that handle authentication for the whole network) and file servers generate enormous volumes. Do not judge on a single 4624; accuracy comes only when you chain multiple events over time, for example “logon from an unfamiliar IP, then access to sensitive files within a few minutes.”
  • Know the “normal combinations” of account, source, and logon type in advance (baselining) and watch for deviations from them. This is the practical approach.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueTacticWhat this event shows
T1078 Valid AccountsStealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial AccessLegitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead
T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral MovementLogonType 10 (RDP) logons
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral MovementSpread of LogonType 3 logons via shares and remote administration
T1550.002 Pass the HashLateral MovementLogonType 3 with NTLM, or LogonType 9 with seclogo (overpass-the-hash)

Mapping as of ATT&CK v19.2. ATT&CK detection strategies DET0560 (T1078), DET0327 (T1021.001), DET0530 (T1021.002) also list this event ID as a log source. To search by technique, see the ATT&CK reverse lookup.

Detection rules

SigmaHQ has 17 and Microsoft Sentinel has 21 public detection rules that use this event ID as a condition. General-purpose rules come first, ordered by severity; rules beyond the first 10 are collapsed.

RuleTypeSeverity
DiagTrackEoP Default Login UsernameSigmaCritical
External Remote SMB Logon from Public IPSigmaHigh
Hacktool RulerSigmaHigh
Metasploit SMB AuthenticationSigmaHigh
Non Domain Controller Active Directory ReplicationSentinel analytics ruleHigh
Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAPSigmaHigh
RDP Login from LocalhostSigmaHigh
RottenPotato Like Attack PatternSigmaHigh
Successful Overpass the Hash AttemptSigmaHigh
External Remote RDP Logon from Public IPSigmaMedium
Other rules (28)
RuleTypeSeverity
Failed AzureAD logons but success logon to hostSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via Remote WMI ExecutionSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled TaskSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Pass the Hash Activity 2SigmaMedium
Potential Access Token AbuseSigmaMedium
Potential Remote Desktop TunnelingSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Rare RDP ConnectionsSentinel analytics ruleMedium
RDP NestingSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Starting or Stopping HealthService to Avoid DetectionSentinel analytics ruleMedium
Admin User Remote LogonSigmaLow
Multiple RDP connections from Single SystemSentinel analytics ruleLow
Outgoing Logon with New CredentialsSigmaLow
SecurityEvent - Multiple authentication failures followed by a successSentinel analytics ruleLow
Successful Account Login Via WMISigmaLow
Potential Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers ActivitySigma (hunting)Medium
Remote Login Performed with WMISentinel hunting queryLow
Decoy User Account Authentication AttemptSentinel hunting query-
Fake computer account authentication attemptSentinel hunting query-
Hosts with new logonsSentinel hunting query-
Rare Processes Run by Service AccountsSentinel hunting query-
Recon Activity with Interactive Logon CorrelationSentinel hunting query-
RID HijackingSentinel hunting query-
Summary of user logons by logon typeSentinel hunting query-
Suspicious Windows Login Outside Normal HoursSentinel hunting query-
Tracking Privileged Account Rare ActivitySentinel hunting query-
EatonForeseer - Unauthorized LoginsSentinel (needs setup)High
Interactive Logon to Server SystemsSigma (needs setup)Medium
Potential Pass the Hash ActivitySigma (needs setup)Medium

Rules are collected from SigmaHQ r2026-07-01 and from Azure-Sentinel as of 2026-10-09, limited to those whose conditions include this event ID. Sentinel rules are limited to those that query the SecurityEvent or WindowsEvent table. “Threat-specific” rules target a particular threat group or malware, and “needs setup” rules require values for your environment. Severity is the value each rule’s author assigned.

Key fields

FieldMeaning
Subject\Security IDThe account that requested the logon. SYSTEM (S-1-5-18) for local processing and NULL SID (S-1-0-0) for network logons are normal. Any other account means a process running as that account requested the logon, so read it together with Process Name
Subject\Logon IDThe session ID of the requester. 0x3E7 is the SYSTEM session. 0x0 means the requester has no session and comes paired with NULL SID; it is entirely normal for network logons (type 3) and is not an anomaly by itself
New Logon\Security ID / Account NameThe account that actually logged on. The main subject of monitoring
New Logon\Logon IDThe ID of the new session. The same value appears in logoff events 4634 / 4647, special privileges 4672, and process creation 4688, so use it to tie a session together from start to finish
Linked Logon IDThe ID of the paired session. With UAC (which runs even administrators with restricted rights by default) enabled, an administrator sign-in creates two sessions, one restricted and one elevated, each carrying the other’s ID. 0x0 when there is no pair
LogonTypeLogon kind. See the logon types table for each value
Authentication PackageKerberos / NTLM / Negotiate. Heavy NTLM use is an investigative lead
Workstation Name / Source Network Address / Source PortThe logon source. May be blank depending on the protocol
Elevated TokenYes means a session elevated to administrator rights
Logon Process / Process NameThe process that produced the logon. Values like seclogo help infer the technique

Glossary

  • SID — a unique identification number assigned to each account or group. It pays to memorize common values such as S-1-5-18 for SYSTEM.
  • Service account — an account created to run programs or services, rather than for a person to use.
  • Correlation — cross-checking several logs to reconstruct a sequence of activity that a single event cannot show.
  • Baseline — recording the normal state in advance and using it as the reference for anomaly detection.

References