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ATT&CK reverse lookup

MITRE ATT&CK reverse lookup: Windows Event IDs by technique

A list for finding the Windows security event IDs to use for detection and investigation, starting from a MITRE ATT&CK technique. It reorganizes each event article’s “MITRE ATT&CK mapping” from the technique side.

  • It covers 89 techniques and 191 events.
  • Tactics follow the order of the ATT&CK matrix. A technique that belongs to several tactics is listed under each of them.
  • “Supporting” events do not map to the technique directly but are worth reviewing alongside it during an investigation.
  • Mappings are as of ATT&CK v19.2. In v19, Defense Evasion was split into Stealth and Defense Impairment.

View in ATT&CK Navigator

The same mapping is available as an ATT&CK Navigator layer. Open it in Navigator to see the Windows matrix with techniques shaded by the number of directly mapped events. Hover over a technique to see what each event shows, or right-click it for links to the event articles.

  • Layer JSON: English, Japanese
  • Darker means more directly mapped events, with the darkest shade at 5 or more. Gray marks techniques that have supporting events only.

Initial Access (TA0001)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1078 Valid Accounts4624 An account was successfully logged onLegitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentialsLogons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logonStart of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration
4722 A user account was enabledRe-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts
4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logonAdmin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours
Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.002 Domain AccountsSupporting: 5138No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.003 Local Accounts4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator passwordLogons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator)
T1200 Hardware Additions6416 A new external device was recognized by the SystemConnection of rogue devices such as BadUSB
6423 The installation of this device is forbidden by system policyAttempts to connect a prohibited device
Supporting: 5632, 5633, 6424No direct mapping, but review alongside it

Execution (TA0002)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1053.005 Scheduled Task4698 A scheduled task was createdRed flags in the XML definition’s Actions, Principal, and triggers
4699 A scheduled task was deletedA quick create → run → delete sequence
4700 A scheduled task was enabledEnabling a normally disabled task only when it is time to run
4701 A scheduled task was disabledDisabling a malicious task after it runs to keep a low profile
4702 A scheduled task was updatedRewriting an existing task’s Actions for quieter persistence than creating a new one
T1059.001 PowerShell4688 A new process has been createdPowerShell launched with -enc or -nop -w hidden
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell4688 A new process has been createdcmd.exe spawned from processes such as w3wp.exe
T1204.002 Malicious File4688 A new process has been createdShells launched from Office documents such as winword.exe
T1569.002 Service Execution4697 A service was installed in the systemRemote service creation and execution, PsExec style
T1574.001 DLL6410 Code integrity determined that a file does not meet the requirements to load into a processLoading of DLLs that fail signing requirements (side-loading and the like)

Persistence (TA0003)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1037.003 Network Logon Script5136 A directory service object was modifiedRewriting scriptPath (logon script)
T1053.005 Scheduled Task4698 A scheduled task was createdRed flags in the XML definition’s Actions, Principal, and triggers
4699 A scheduled task was deletedA quick create → run → delete sequence
4700 A scheduled task was enabledEnabling a normally disabled task only when it is time to run
4701 A scheduled task was disabledDisabling a malicious task after it runs to keep a low profile
4702 A scheduled task was updatedRewriting an existing task’s Actions for quieter persistence than creating a new one
T1078 Valid Accounts4624 An account was successfully logged onLegitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentialsLogons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logonStart of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration
4722 A user account was enabledRe-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts
4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logonAdmin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours
Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.002 Domain AccountsSupporting: 5138No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.003 Local Accounts4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator passwordLogons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator)
T1098 Account Manipulation4704 A user right was assignedGranting powerful rights such as SeDebugPrivilege to unexpected accounts to dig in
4717 System security access was granted to an accountGranting remote / network logon rights to an attacker-controlled account
4724 An attempt was made to reset an account’s passwordResetting a target account’s password to take control
4738 A user account was changedSetting risky flags such as PASSWD_NOTREQD, DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD, and TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
4742 A computer account was changedSetting msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity (RBCD) or TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
4780 The ACL was set on accounts which are members of administrators groups (AdminSDHolder)Permissions added to the AdminSDHolder ACL propagate to every privileged account via SDProp
4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator passwordSetting the DSRM password and combining it with DsrmAdminLogonBehavior as a DC backdoor
5136 A directory service object was modifiedChanges to the AdminSDHolder ACL or RBCD (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity)
T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups4627 Group membership informationA privileged group SID the account should not have suggests the result of an illicit group addition
4728 A member was added to a security-enabled global groupAdditions to privileged domain groups such as Domain Admins, Group Policy Creator Owners, and DnsAdmins
4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled global groupTemporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local groupAdditions to Administrators or Remote Desktop Users
4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled local groupTemporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled universal groupAdditions to forest-wide privileged groups such as Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins
4764 A group’s type was changedConverting a distribution group with stockpiled members into a security group to grant access all at once
Supporting: 4727, 4731, 4754No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1112 Modify Registry4657 A registry value was modifiedTampering with defense- or authentication-related values such as LSA Authentication Packages / Notification Packages
T1136.001 Local Account4720 A user account was createdCreation of a local backdoor account
T1136.002 Domain Account4720 A user account was createdCreation of a domain backdoor account
4741 A computer account was createdMachine accounts created by regular users through MachineAccountQuota
T1542.003 Bootkit4826 Boot Configuration Data loadedSettings that enable boot-level tampering such as bootkits
T1543.003 Windows Service4657 A registry value was modifiedRewrites of service definitions (such as ImagePath)
4697 A service was installed in the systemServices created with ServiceFileName pointing to powershell / cmd / temp folders or admin shares
T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection4657 A registry value was modifiedValues added under Image File Execution Options
T1546.015 Component Object Model HijackingSupporting: 5888, 5890No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder4657 A registry value was modifiedChanges to autostart values such as the Run key
T1547.002 Authentication Package4610 An authentication package has been loaded by the LSALoading of an authentication package other than the default msv1_0
T1547.005 Security Support Provider4622 A security package has been loaded by the LSALoading of a security package (SSP) not on the default list
Supporting: 5063No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary5038 Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file is not validTampering with a signed file (embedding a backdoor) breaks its hash
6281 Code Integrity determined that the page hashes of an image file are not validPartial tampering of a file (page hash mismatch)
T1556.002 Password Filter DLL4614 A notification package (password filter) has been loaded by the SAMLoading of a notification package (password filter) the organization has not approved
T1556.005 Reversible Encryption4739 Domain Policy was changedEnabling password storage with reversible encryption

Privilege Escalation (TA0004)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1037.003 Network Logon Script5136 A directory service object was modifiedRewriting scriptPath (logon script)
T1053.005 Scheduled Task4698 A scheduled task was createdRed flags in the XML definition’s Actions, Principal, and triggers
4699 A scheduled task was deletedA quick create → run → delete sequence
4700 A scheduled task was enabledEnabling a normally disabled task only when it is time to run
4701 A scheduled task was disabledDisabling a malicious task after it runs to keep a low profile
4702 A scheduled task was updatedRewriting an existing task’s Actions for quieter persistence than creating a new one
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation4741 A computer account was createdThe first step of noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287) or RBCD abuse
4742 A computer account was changednoPac preparation such as removing servicePrincipalName
Supporting: 4664No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078 Valid Accounts4624 An account was successfully logged onLegitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentialsLogons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logonStart of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration
4722 A user account was enabledRe-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts
4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logonAdmin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours
Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.002 Domain AccountsSupporting: 5138No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.003 Local Accounts4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator passwordLogons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator)
T1098 Account Manipulation4704 A user right was assignedGranting powerful rights such as SeDebugPrivilege to unexpected accounts to dig in
4717 System security access was granted to an accountGranting remote / network logon rights to an attacker-controlled account
4724 An attempt was made to reset an account’s passwordResetting a target account’s password to take control
4738 A user account was changedSetting risky flags such as PASSWD_NOTREQD, DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD, and TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
4742 A computer account was changedSetting msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity (RBCD) or TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
4780 The ACL was set on accounts which are members of administrators groups (AdminSDHolder)Permissions added to the AdminSDHolder ACL propagate to every privileged account via SDProp
4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator passwordSetting the DSRM password and combining it with DsrmAdminLogonBehavior as a DC backdoor
5136 A directory service object was modifiedChanges to the AdminSDHolder ACL or RBCD (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity)
T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups4627 Group membership informationA privileged group SID the account should not have suggests the result of an illicit group addition
4728 A member was added to a security-enabled global groupAdditions to privileged domain groups such as Domain Admins, Group Policy Creator Owners, and DnsAdmins
4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled global groupTemporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local groupAdditions to Administrators or Remote Desktop Users
4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled local groupTemporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled universal groupAdditions to forest-wide privileged groups such as Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins
4764 A group’s type was changedConverting a distribution group with stockpiled members into a security group to grant access all at once
Supporting: 4727, 4731, 4754No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1134 Access Token Manipulation4673 A privileged service was calledA record of an unexpected account actually using powerful privileges granted in 4672
4703 A user right (token privilege) was adjustedPowerful privileges enabled by an unexpected process or account
T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft4672 Special privileges assigned to new logonSessions with SeImpersonatePrivilege are the starting point for potato-style privilege escalation
T1134.002 Create Process with Token4696 A primary token was assigned to processProcess execution with another user’s token (logged on older OS versions)
T1134.005 SID-History Injection4675 SIDs were filteredRecords privileged SIDs brought across a trust and removed by filtering
4706 A new trust was created to a domainA trust without SID filtering allows cross-trust escalation via SID History
4716 Trusted domain information was modifiedWith SID filtering off, privileged SIDs can be brought in via SID History
4765 SID History was added to an accountInjecting a privileged group’s SID into sIDHistory
4766 An attempt to add SID History to an account failedTraces of a failed SID History injection attempt
4830 SID History was removed from an accountAttackers may also delete injected SID History to remove traces
T1484.001 Group Policy Modification4704 A user right was assignedIf the right came through a GPO, check for Group Policy tampering
4713 Kerberos policy was changedKerberos policy is distributed by domain Group Policy, so check it alongside GPO changes
4739 Domain Policy was changedWeakening the domain password policy, for example by lowering the minimum length or disabling complexity
4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings have changed and were appliedTampering with a GPO to loosen the firewall on every machine under it
5136 A directory service object was modifiedChanges to Group Policy containers or gPCFileSysPath
5137 A directory service object was createdCreation of a new GPO
Supporting: 4714, 5139, 6144No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1484.002 Trust Modification4706 A new trust was created to a domainAdding a trust to a domain the attacker controls
4707 A trust to a domain was removedUnplanned trust removal
4716 Trusted domain information was modifiedDisabling SID filtering or widening a trust’s direction or scope
4864 A namespace collision was detectedA collision where a trust partner claims an existing domain’s namespace
4865 A trusted forest information entry was addedAdding namespaces that should not be accepted, such as attacker-controlled domains
4866 A trusted forest information entry was removedUnplanned removal of forest trust information
4867 A trusted forest information entry was modifiedWidening a trust’s scope, for example by accepting a previously excluded namespace
T1543.003 Windows Service4657 A registry value was modifiedRewrites of service definitions (such as ImagePath)
4697 A service was installed in the systemServices created with ServiceFileName pointing to powershell / cmd / temp folders or admin shares
T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection4657 A registry value was modifiedValues added under Image File Execution Options
T1546.015 Component Object Model HijackingSupporting: 5888, 5890No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder4657 A registry value was modifiedChanges to autostart values such as the Run key
T1547.002 Authentication Package4610 An authentication package has been loaded by the LSALoading of an authentication package other than the default msv1_0
T1547.005 Security Support Provider4622 A security package has been loaded by the LSALoading of a security package (SSP) not on the default list
Supporting: 5063No direct mapping, but review alongside it

Stealth (TA0005)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1036 MasqueradingSupporting: 4735No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service4697 A service was installed in the systemNames mimicking legitimate services with unexpected executable paths
T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name4720 A user account was createdNames posing as service or admin accounts
4781 The name of an account was changedRenaming an attacker account to look like a legitimate one
T1070 Indicator Removal5144 A network share object was deletedDeleting a share used for exfiltration or tool distribution
T1070.004 File Deletion4660 An object was deletedFile deletion to remove traces
4663 An attempt was made to access an objectTrace removal through DELETE access
T1070.006 TimestompSupporting: 4616No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1070.009 Clear Persistence4699 A scheduled task was deletedDeleting a persistence task after the objective to remove traces
4726 A user account was deletedDeleting accounts created during the compromise to remove traces
Supporting: 4730, 4734, 4743, 5889No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078 Valid Accounts4624 An account was successfully logged onLegitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentialsLogons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logonStart of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration
4722 A user account was enabledRe-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts
4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logonAdmin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours
Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.002 Domain AccountsSupporting: 5138No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1078.003 Local Accounts4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator passwordLogons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator)
T1134 Access Token Manipulation4673 A privileged service was calledA record of an unexpected account actually using powerful privileges granted in 4672
4703 A user right (token privilege) was adjustedPowerful privileges enabled by an unexpected process or account
T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft4672 Special privileges assigned to new logonSessions with SeImpersonatePrivilege are the starting point for potato-style privilege escalation
T1134.002 Create Process with Token4696 A primary token was assigned to processProcess execution with another user’s token (logged on older OS versions)
T1134.005 SID-History Injection4675 SIDs were filteredRecords privileged SIDs brought across a trust and removed by filtering
4706 A new trust was created to a domainA trust without SID filtering allows cross-trust escalation via SID History
4716 Trusted domain information was modifiedWith SID filtering off, privileged SIDs can be brought in via SID History
4765 SID History was added to an accountInjecting a privileged group’s SID into sIDHistory
4766 An attempt to add SID History to an account failedTraces of a failed SID History injection attempt
4830 SID History was removed from an accountAttackers may also delete injected SID History to remove traces
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution4688 A new process has been createdAbuse of built-in binaries such as regsvr32 / mshta / rundll32
T1542.003 Bootkit4826 Boot Configuration Data loadedSettings that enable boot-level tampering such as bootkits
T1574.001 DLL6410 Code integrity determined that a file does not meet the requirements to load into a processLoading of DLLs that fail signing requirements (side-loading and the like)

Defense Impairment (TA0112)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1112 Modify Registry4657 A registry value was modifiedTampering with defense- or authentication-related values such as LSA Authentication Packages / Notification Packages
T1207 Rogue Domain Controller4928 An Active Directory replica source naming context was establishedReplication relationships established with a non-legitimate DC (DCShadow and the like)
4929 An Active Directory replica source naming context was removedRemoval of the relationship after a rogue DC was registered and used
4930 An Active Directory replica source naming context was modifiedChanges to replication paths involving unexpected partners
4931 An Active Directory replica destination naming context was modifiedUnexpected changes to destination settings
Supporting: 4932, 4933, 4934No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1222.001 Windows Permissions4670 Permissions on an object were changedDACL or owner changes on sensitive files and registry keys
Supporting: 4819, 4911, 4913No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1484.001 Group Policy Modification4704 A user right was assignedIf the right came through a GPO, check for Group Policy tampering
4713 Kerberos policy was changedKerberos policy is distributed by domain Group Policy, so check it alongside GPO changes
4739 Domain Policy was changedWeakening the domain password policy, for example by lowering the minimum length or disabling complexity
4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings have changed and were appliedTampering with a GPO to loosen the firewall on every machine under it
5136 A directory service object was modifiedChanges to Group Policy containers or gPCFileSysPath
5137 A directory service object was createdCreation of a new GPO
Supporting: 4714, 5139, 6144No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1484.002 Trust Modification4706 A new trust was created to a domainAdding a trust to a domain the attacker controls
4707 A trust to a domain was removedUnplanned trust removal
4716 Trusted domain information was modifiedDisabling SID filtering or widening a trust’s direction or scope
4864 A namespace collision was detectedA collision where a trust partner claims an existing domain’s namespace
4865 A trusted forest information entry was addedAdding namespaces that should not be accepted, such as attacker-controlled domains
4866 A trusted forest information entry was removedUnplanned removal of forest trust information
4867 A trusted forest information entry was modifiedWidening a trust’s scope, for example by accepting a previously excluded namespace
T1553.006 Code Signing Policy Modification4826 Boot Configuration Data loadedEnabling test signing or disabling driver signature enforcement and integrity checks
T1556.002 Password Filter DLL4614 A notification package (password filter) has been loaded by the SAMLoading of a notification package (password filter) the organization has not approved
T1556.005 Reversible Encryption4739 Domain Policy was changedEnabling password storage with reversible encryption
T1685 Disable or Modify Tools4689 A process has exitedUnexpected termination of monitoring or defense processes such as EDR agents and log forwarders
4701 A scheduled task was disabledDisabling legitimate monitoring or security tasks
4705 A user right was removedRemoving rights that security products or backups need, to stop them working
5447 A Windows Filtering Platform filter has been changedAdding WFP filters that block EDR traffic (EDRSilencer and the like)
Supporting: 6406, 6408, 6419, 6420No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log1100 The event logging service has shut downAn unplanned service stop halts logging. Normal shutdowns also log it, so pair it with 4608
4715 The audit policy (SACL) on an object was changedWidening who can change audit policy, as a foothold for disabling auditing later
4719 System audit policy was changedDisabling key subcategories such as process creation and logon with tools like auditpol
4817 Auditing settings on object were changed (Global Object Access)Weakening or removing global SACLs to stop wide-ranging access auditing at once
4902 The Per-user audit policy table was createdA per-user setting planted to weaken auditing for specific accounts only
4905 An attempt was made to unregister a security event sourceUnregistering a legitimate product’s event source to cut off its logs
4906 The CrashOnAuditFail value has changedDisabling CrashOnAuditFail as groundwork before stopping auditing
4907 Auditing settings on object were changedRemoving SACLs from important objects so access goes unrecorded
4908 Special Groups Logon table modifiedRemoving monitored groups so special-group logons go unrecorded
4912 Per User Audit Policy was changedWeakening auditing for specific accounts only, so activity goes unrecorded while the overall policy looks intact
Supporting: 1104, 1108, 4612, 4621, 4904No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs1102 The audit log was clearedRecords the clearing of the Security log itself
4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged objectUse of SeSecurityPrivilege can precede a log clear
Supporting: 1105No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall4944 The policy active when the Windows Firewall startedThe firewall starting in a disabled or loosened state
4945 A rule was listed when the Windows Firewall startedFinding permanent allow rules that were planted
4946 A rule was added to the Windows Firewall exception listAllow rules added for C2, remote access, or lateral movement
4947 A rule in the Windows Firewall exception list was modifiedRewriting an existing rule to widen what it allows
4948 A rule in the Windows Firewall exception list was deletedDeletion of protective block rules
4949 Windows Firewall settings were restored to the default valuesWiping out defensive rules the organization added
4950 A Windows Firewall setting has changedDisabling a profile or changing the default inbound action
4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings have changed and were appliedWeakened defenses from the applied settings
5025 The Windows Firewall Service has been stoppedStopping the service to lift all traffic restrictions at once
5034 The Windows Firewall Driver was stoppedStopping the driver disables packet filtering
5447 A Windows Filtering Platform filter has been changedManipulating WFP filters to disable blocks or insert allows
Supporting: 4953, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5035, 5037No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1688 Safe Mode BootSupporting: 4608No direct mapping, but review alongside it

Credential Access (TA0006)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1003 OS Credential Dumping4782 The password hash of an account was accessedPassword hash retrieval through the migration API
T1003.001 LSASS Memory4656 A handle to an object was requestedHandle requests to the LSASS process (requires a SACL on LSASS and the matching audit setting)
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logonSeDebugPrivilege is what LSASS memory reads rely on
4690 An attempt was made to duplicate a handle to an objectDuplicating an LSASS handle to read it without opening the process directly
4703 A user right (token privilege) was adjustedEnabling SeDebugPrivilege before reading LSASS (such as mimikatz privilege::debug)
Supporting: 5378No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1003.006 DCSync4662 An operation was performed on an objectDS-Replication-Get-Changes(-All) requested by a non-machine account
Supporting: 4932, 4933, 4934No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1110 Brute Force4739 Domain Policy was changedRaising or disabling the lockout threshold paves the way for brute force
Supporting: 4767No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1110.001 Password Guessing4625 An account failed to log onMany failures against one account in a short time
4740 A user account was locked outRepeated lockouts of a single account
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failedConsecutive 0x18 failures against a single account
4776 The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account (NTLM)Consecutive 0xC000006A failures against one account
T1110.003 Password Spraying4625 An account failed to log onA few failures each against many accounts from one source
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentialsBursts on a workstation suggest spraying or automation
4740 A user account was locked outLockouts of many accounts in a short time
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed0x18 failures spreading from one source to many accounts
4776 The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account (NTLM)0xC000006A failures from one source against many accounts
T1552.004 Private Keys5058 Key file operationPrivate key files read or exported by an unexpected account
5059 Key migration operationMigrations (exports) that move private keys elsewhere
Supporting: 5061No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores4692 Backup of data protection master key was attemptedA lead on attempts to reach DPAPI-protected stored credentials (browsers, Credential Manager)
4693 Recovery of data protection master key was attemptedMaster key recovery by an unexpected subject. A stolen domain DPAPI backup key decrypts any user’s protected data
4695 Unprotection of auditable protected data was attemptedDecryption of protected data by an unexpected subject or process
Supporting: 4694No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager5376 Credential Manager credentials were backed upExporting Credential Manager contents through a bulk backup
5377 Credential Manager credentials were restored from a backupRestoring a backup obtained from another environment
T1556.002 Password Filter DLL4614 A notification package (password filter) has been loaded by the SAMLoading of a notification package (password filter) the organization has not approved
T1556.005 Reversible Encryption4739 Domain Policy was changedEnabling password storage with reversible encryption
T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle4816 RPC detected an integrity violation while decrypting an incoming messageSigns of RPC messages tampered with in transit (often a fault instead)
T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay5168 SPN check for SMB/SMB2 failedSMB authentication failing on an SPN mismatch indicates NTLM relay
T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets4611 A trusted logon process has been registered with the LSARubeus registers the logon process User32LogonProcesss to get an LSA handle for ticket operations. Names outside the known legitimate set are the lead
4673 A privileged service was calledUse of SeTcbPrivilege when Rubeus registers a logon process to get an LSA handle (read with 4611)
T1558.003 Kerberoasting4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requestedRC4 (0x17) service tickets, or requests for many SPNs in a short time
5136 A directory service object was modifiedPreparing targeted Kerberoasting by adding a servicePrincipalName
Supporting: 4770No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting4738 A user account was changedChanges to DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH (no pre-authentication)
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requestedTGT requests with Pre-Authentication Type 0
T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates4742 A computer account was changedCertifried (CVE-2022-26923) preparation by rewriting dNSHostName
5058 Key file operationStealing a certificate’s private key for impersonation
5059 Key migration operationStealing a certificate’s private key for impersonation
Supporting: 4774No direct mapping, but review alongside it

Discovery (TA0007)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1046 Network Service Discovery5150 The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packetAggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts
5151 A more restrictive Windows Filtering Platform filter has blocked a packetAggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts
5152 The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet (packet drop)Aggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts
5153 A more restrictive Windows Filtering Platform filter has blocked a packet (packet drop)Aggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts
T1069.001 Local Groups4798 A user’s local group membership was enumeratedEnumeration of the local groups a user belongs to
4799 A security-enabled local group membership was enumeratedEnumeration of local group members such as Administrators
T1069.002 Domain Groups4661 A handle to an AD/SAM object was requestedEnumeration of group objects (BloodHound-style discovery and the like)
T1087.001 Local Account4798 A user’s local group membership was enumeratedDiscovery of local account information
T1087.002 Domain Account4661 A handle to an AD/SAM object was requestedBroad read requests against SAM / AD user objects
4662 An operation was performed on an objectBroad access to AD object attributes
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requestedBursts of failures for non-existent usernames (0x6) indicate username enumeration
T1201 Password Policy Discovery4793 The Password Policy Checking API was calledProbing the policy to narrow down password candidates

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1021 Remote Services4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentialsLateral movement that uses another account’s credentials to connect to other hosts
T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol4624 An account was successfully logged onLogonType 10 (RDP) logons
4778 A session was reconnected to a Window StationThe sequence of RDP remote access
Supporting: 4634, 4647No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares4624 An account was successfully logged onSpread of LogonType 3 logons via shares and remote administration
5140 A network share object was accessedAccess to C$ / ADMIN$
5145 A network share object was checked for desired access (detailed file share)Access to named pipes under IPC$ (such as svcctl) reveals the remote execution path
T1550.002 Pass the Hash4624 An account was successfully logged onLogonType 3 with NTLM, or LogonType 9 with seclogo (overpass-the-hash)
4776 The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account (NTLM)NTLM authentication with a stolen hash is logged as a success
T1550.003 Pass the Ticket4713 Kerberos policy was changedLonger ticket lifetimes extend how long stolen tickets can be reused
Supporting: 4649No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1563.002 RDP Hijacking4778 A session was reconnected to a Window StationA reconnect from an unexpected source suggests session hijacking
4779 A session was disconnected from a Window StationSessions left disconnected can be hijacked later
T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer5140 A network share object was accessedTransferring tools to lateral-movement targets through admin shares
5142 A network share object was addedCreating a share to distribute tools
Supporting: 5143No direct mapping, but review alongside it

Collection (TA0009)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1005 Data from Local System4656 A handle to an object was requestedAccess requests to sensitive files and registry keys that have a SACL
4663 An attempt was made to access an objectReads of sensitive files
T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive5145 A network share object was checked for desired access (detailed file share)Which files in a share were read, and by whom. Mass reads in a short time indicate data collection
Supporting: 5143No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1074.002 Remote Data Staging5142 A network share object was addedCreating a share to gather collected data
T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle4816 RPC detected an integrity violation while decrypting an incoming messageSigns of RPC messages tampered with in transit (often a fault instead)
T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay5168 SPN check for SMB/SMB2 failedSMB authentication failing on an SPN mismatch indicates NTLM relay

Command and Control (TA0011)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1071 Application Layer Protocol5156 The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connectionWhich process connected to which destination (C2 traffic)
5157 The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connectionBlocked attempts to reach C2
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer4688 A new process has been createdFile downloads with certutil.exe or bitsadmin
T1571 Non-Standard Port5156 The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connectionConnections to non-standard ports

Exfiltration (TA0010)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB4663 An attempt was made to access an objectWrites to removable storage
6416 A new external device was recognized by the SystemThe starting point of exfiltration through USB storage
6423 The installation of this device is forbidden by system policyAttempts to exfiltrate with USB storage
Supporting: 6421, 6422, 6424No direct mapping, but review alongside it

Impact (TA0040)

TechniqueEventWhat this event shows
T1485 Data Destruction4660 An object was deletedMass deletion by one process in a short time (wipers and the like)
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery4660 An object was deletedDeletion of backup files
T1498 Network Denial of Service5148 WFP detected a DoS attack and entered a defensive modeStart and end of a network DoS detected by WFP
5149 The DoS attack has subsided and normal processing is being resumedStart and end of a network DoS detected by WFP
T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged objectUse of the remote shutdown privilege by an unexpected subject
Supporting: 4608No direct mapping, but review alongside it
T1531 Account Access Removal4718 System security access was removed from an accountRemoving logon rights from legitimate or service accounts to block access
4723 An attempt was made to change an account’s passwordChanges by someone other than the owner, or many changes in a short time, suggest locking out legitimate users
4724 An attempt was made to reset an account’s passwordLocking out the legitimate user through a reset
4725 A user account was disabledBlocking access by disabling admins or other important accounts
4726 A user account was deletedDeletion of important legitimate accounts
4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled global groupRemoving legitimate admins from privileged groups
4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled local groupRemoving legitimate admins from Administrators
Supporting: 4730, 4734No direct mapping, but review alongside it