MITRE ATT&CK reverse lookup: Windows Event IDs by technique
A list for finding the Windows security event IDs to use for detection and investigation, starting from a MITRE ATT&CK technique. It reorganizes each event article’s “MITRE ATT&CK mapping” from the technique side.
- It covers 89 techniques and 191 events.
- Tactics follow the order of the ATT&CK matrix. A technique that belongs to several tactics is listed under each of them.
- “Supporting” events do not map to the technique directly but are worth reviewing alongside it during an investigation.
- Mappings are as of ATT&CK v19.2. In v19, Defense Evasion was split into Stealth and Defense Impairment.
View in ATT&CK Navigator
The same mapping is available as an ATT&CK Navigator layer. Open it in Navigator to see the Windows matrix with techniques shaded by the number of directly mapped events. Hover over a technique to see what each event shows, or right-click it for links to the event articles.
- Layer JSON: English, Japanese
- Darker means more directly mapped events, with the darkest shade at 5 or more. Gray marks techniques that have supporting events only.
Initial Access (TA0001)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1078 Valid Accounts | 4624 An account was successfully logged on | Legitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead |
| 4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials | Logons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec | |
| 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon | Start of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration | |
| 4722 A user account was enabled | Re-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts | |
| 4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logon | Admin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours | |
| Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts | Supporting: 5138 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts | 4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator password | Logons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator) |
| T1200 Hardware Additions | 6416 A new external device was recognized by the System | Connection of rogue devices such as BadUSB |
| 6423 The installation of this device is forbidden by system policy | Attempts to connect a prohibited device | |
| Supporting: 5632, 5633, 6424 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
Execution (TA0002)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task | 4698 A scheduled task was created | Red flags in the XML definition’s Actions, Principal, and triggers |
| 4699 A scheduled task was deleted | A quick create → run → delete sequence | |
| 4700 A scheduled task was enabled | Enabling a normally disabled task only when it is time to run | |
| 4701 A scheduled task was disabled | Disabling a malicious task after it runs to keep a low profile | |
| 4702 A scheduled task was updated | Rewriting an existing task’s Actions for quieter persistence than creating a new one | |
| T1059.001 PowerShell | 4688 A new process has been created | PowerShell launched with -enc or -nop -w hidden |
| T1059.003 Windows Command Shell | 4688 A new process has been created | cmd.exe spawned from processes such as w3wp.exe |
| T1204.002 Malicious File | 4688 A new process has been created | Shells launched from Office documents such as winword.exe |
| T1569.002 Service Execution | 4697 A service was installed in the system | Remote service creation and execution, PsExec style |
| T1574.001 DLL | 6410 Code integrity determined that a file does not meet the requirements to load into a process | Loading of DLLs that fail signing requirements (side-loading and the like) |
Persistence (TA0003)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1037.003 Network Logon Script | 5136 A directory service object was modified | Rewriting scriptPath (logon script) |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task | 4698 A scheduled task was created | Red flags in the XML definition’s Actions, Principal, and triggers |
| 4699 A scheduled task was deleted | A quick create → run → delete sequence | |
| 4700 A scheduled task was enabled | Enabling a normally disabled task only when it is time to run | |
| 4701 A scheduled task was disabled | Disabling a malicious task after it runs to keep a low profile | |
| 4702 A scheduled task was updated | Rewriting an existing task’s Actions for quieter persistence than creating a new one | |
| T1078 Valid Accounts | 4624 An account was successfully logged on | Legitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead |
| 4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials | Logons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec | |
| 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon | Start of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration | |
| 4722 A user account was enabled | Re-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts | |
| 4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logon | Admin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours | |
| Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts | Supporting: 5138 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts | 4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator password | Logons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator) |
| T1098 Account Manipulation | 4704 A user right was assigned | Granting powerful rights such as SeDebugPrivilege to unexpected accounts to dig in |
| 4717 System security access was granted to an account | Granting remote / network logon rights to an attacker-controlled account | |
| 4724 An attempt was made to reset an account’s password | Resetting a target account’s password to take control | |
| 4738 A user account was changed | Setting risky flags such as PASSWD_NOTREQD, DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD, and TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION | |
| 4742 A computer account was changed | Setting msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity (RBCD) or TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION | |
| 4780 The ACL was set on accounts which are members of administrators groups (AdminSDHolder) | Permissions added to the AdminSDHolder ACL propagate to every privileged account via SDProp | |
| 4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator password | Setting the DSRM password and combining it with DsrmAdminLogonBehavior as a DC backdoor | |
| 5136 A directory service object was modified | Changes to the AdminSDHolder ACL or RBCD (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity) | |
| T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups | 4627 Group membership information | A privileged group SID the account should not have suggests the result of an illicit group addition |
| 4728 A member was added to a security-enabled global group | Additions to privileged domain groups such as Domain Admins, Group Policy Creator Owners, and DnsAdmins | |
| 4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled global group | Temporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after | |
| 4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local group | Additions to Administrators or Remote Desktop Users | |
| 4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled local group | Temporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after | |
| 4756 A member was added to a security-enabled universal group | Additions to forest-wide privileged groups such as Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins | |
| 4764 A group’s type was changed | Converting a distribution group with stockpiled members into a security group to grant access all at once | |
| Supporting: 4727, 4731, 4754 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1112 Modify Registry | 4657 A registry value was modified | Tampering with defense- or authentication-related values such as LSA Authentication Packages / Notification Packages |
| T1136.001 Local Account | 4720 A user account was created | Creation of a local backdoor account |
| T1136.002 Domain Account | 4720 A user account was created | Creation of a domain backdoor account |
| 4741 A computer account was created | Machine accounts created by regular users through MachineAccountQuota | |
| T1542.003 Bootkit | 4826 Boot Configuration Data loaded | Settings that enable boot-level tampering such as bootkits |
| T1543.003 Windows Service | 4657 A registry value was modified | Rewrites of service definitions (such as ImagePath) |
| 4697 A service was installed in the system | Services created with ServiceFileName pointing to powershell / cmd / temp folders or admin shares | |
| T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection | 4657 A registry value was modified | Values added under Image File Execution Options |
| T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking | Supporting: 5888, 5890 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | 4657 A registry value was modified | Changes to autostart values such as the Run key |
| T1547.002 Authentication Package | 4610 An authentication package has been loaded by the LSA | Loading of an authentication package other than the default msv1_0 |
| T1547.005 Security Support Provider | 4622 A security package has been loaded by the LSA | Loading of a security package (SSP) not on the default list |
| Supporting: 5063 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary | 5038 Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file is not valid | Tampering with a signed file (embedding a backdoor) breaks its hash |
| 6281 Code Integrity determined that the page hashes of an image file are not valid | Partial tampering of a file (page hash mismatch) | |
| T1556.002 Password Filter DLL | 4614 A notification package (password filter) has been loaded by the SAM | Loading of a notification package (password filter) the organization has not approved |
| T1556.005 Reversible Encryption | 4739 Domain Policy was changed | Enabling password storage with reversible encryption |
Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1037.003 Network Logon Script | 5136 A directory service object was modified | Rewriting scriptPath (logon script) |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task | 4698 A scheduled task was created | Red flags in the XML definition’s Actions, Principal, and triggers |
| 4699 A scheduled task was deleted | A quick create → run → delete sequence | |
| 4700 A scheduled task was enabled | Enabling a normally disabled task only when it is time to run | |
| 4701 A scheduled task was disabled | Disabling a malicious task after it runs to keep a low profile | |
| 4702 A scheduled task was updated | Rewriting an existing task’s Actions for quieter persistence than creating a new one | |
| T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | 4741 A computer account was created | The first step of noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287) or RBCD abuse |
| 4742 A computer account was changed | noPac preparation such as removing servicePrincipalName | |
| Supporting: 4664 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1078 Valid Accounts | 4624 An account was successfully logged on | Legitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead |
| 4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials | Logons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec | |
| 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon | Start of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration | |
| 4722 A user account was enabled | Re-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts | |
| 4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logon | Admin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours | |
| Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts | Supporting: 5138 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts | 4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator password | Logons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator) |
| T1098 Account Manipulation | 4704 A user right was assigned | Granting powerful rights such as SeDebugPrivilege to unexpected accounts to dig in |
| 4717 System security access was granted to an account | Granting remote / network logon rights to an attacker-controlled account | |
| 4724 An attempt was made to reset an account’s password | Resetting a target account’s password to take control | |
| 4738 A user account was changed | Setting risky flags such as PASSWD_NOTREQD, DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD, and TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION | |
| 4742 A computer account was changed | Setting msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity (RBCD) or TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION | |
| 4780 The ACL was set on accounts which are members of administrators groups (AdminSDHolder) | Permissions added to the AdminSDHolder ACL propagate to every privileged account via SDProp | |
| 4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator password | Setting the DSRM password and combining it with DsrmAdminLogonBehavior as a DC backdoor | |
| 5136 A directory service object was modified | Changes to the AdminSDHolder ACL or RBCD (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity) | |
| T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups | 4627 Group membership information | A privileged group SID the account should not have suggests the result of an illicit group addition |
| 4728 A member was added to a security-enabled global group | Additions to privileged domain groups such as Domain Admins, Group Policy Creator Owners, and DnsAdmins | |
| 4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled global group | Temporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after | |
| 4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local group | Additions to Administrators or Remote Desktop Users | |
| 4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled local group | Temporarily joining a privileged group, acting, and leaving right after | |
| 4756 A member was added to a security-enabled universal group | Additions to forest-wide privileged groups such as Enterprise Admins / Schema Admins | |
| 4764 A group’s type was changed | Converting a distribution group with stockpiled members into a security group to grant access all at once | |
| Supporting: 4727, 4731, 4754 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1134 Access Token Manipulation | 4673 A privileged service was called | A record of an unexpected account actually using powerful privileges granted in 4672 |
| 4703 A user right (token privilege) was adjusted | Powerful privileges enabled by an unexpected process or account | |
| T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft | 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon | Sessions with SeImpersonatePrivilege are the starting point for potato-style privilege escalation |
| T1134.002 Create Process with Token | 4696 A primary token was assigned to process | Process execution with another user’s token (logged on older OS versions) |
| T1134.005 SID-History Injection | 4675 SIDs were filtered | Records privileged SIDs brought across a trust and removed by filtering |
| 4706 A new trust was created to a domain | A trust without SID filtering allows cross-trust escalation via SID History | |
| 4716 Trusted domain information was modified | With SID filtering off, privileged SIDs can be brought in via SID History | |
| 4765 SID History was added to an account | Injecting a privileged group’s SID into sIDHistory | |
| 4766 An attempt to add SID History to an account failed | Traces of a failed SID History injection attempt | |
| 4830 SID History was removed from an account | Attackers may also delete injected SID History to remove traces | |
| T1484.001 Group Policy Modification | 4704 A user right was assigned | If the right came through a GPO, check for Group Policy tampering |
| 4713 Kerberos policy was changed | Kerberos policy is distributed by domain Group Policy, so check it alongside GPO changes | |
| 4739 Domain Policy was changed | Weakening the domain password policy, for example by lowering the minimum length or disabling complexity | |
| 4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings have changed and were applied | Tampering with a GPO to loosen the firewall on every machine under it | |
| 5136 A directory service object was modified | Changes to Group Policy containers or gPCFileSysPath | |
| 5137 A directory service object was created | Creation of a new GPO | |
| Supporting: 4714, 5139, 6144 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1484.002 Trust Modification | 4706 A new trust was created to a domain | Adding a trust to a domain the attacker controls |
| 4707 A trust to a domain was removed | Unplanned trust removal | |
| 4716 Trusted domain information was modified | Disabling SID filtering or widening a trust’s direction or scope | |
| 4864 A namespace collision was detected | A collision where a trust partner claims an existing domain’s namespace | |
| 4865 A trusted forest information entry was added | Adding namespaces that should not be accepted, such as attacker-controlled domains | |
| 4866 A trusted forest information entry was removed | Unplanned removal of forest trust information | |
| 4867 A trusted forest information entry was modified | Widening a trust’s scope, for example by accepting a previously excluded namespace | |
| T1543.003 Windows Service | 4657 A registry value was modified | Rewrites of service definitions (such as ImagePath) |
| 4697 A service was installed in the system | Services created with ServiceFileName pointing to powershell / cmd / temp folders or admin shares | |
| T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection | 4657 A registry value was modified | Values added under Image File Execution Options |
| T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking | Supporting: 5888, 5890 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | 4657 A registry value was modified | Changes to autostart values such as the Run key |
| T1547.002 Authentication Package | 4610 An authentication package has been loaded by the LSA | Loading of an authentication package other than the default msv1_0 |
| T1547.005 Security Support Provider | 4622 A security package has been loaded by the LSA | Loading of a security package (SSP) not on the default list |
| Supporting: 5063 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
Stealth (TA0005)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1036 Masquerading | Supporting: 4735 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service | 4697 A service was installed in the system | Names mimicking legitimate services with unexpected executable paths |
| T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name | 4720 A user account was created | Names posing as service or admin accounts |
| 4781 The name of an account was changed | Renaming an attacker account to look like a legitimate one | |
| T1070 Indicator Removal | 5144 A network share object was deleted | Deleting a share used for exfiltration or tool distribution |
| T1070.004 File Deletion | 4660 An object was deleted | File deletion to remove traces |
| 4663 An attempt was made to access an object | Trace removal through DELETE access | |
| T1070.006 Timestomp | Supporting: 4616 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1070.009 Clear Persistence | 4699 A scheduled task was deleted | Deleting a persistence task after the objective to remove traces |
| 4726 A user account was deleted | Deleting accounts created during the compromise to remove traces | |
| Supporting: 4730, 4734, 4743, 5889 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1078 Valid Accounts | 4624 An account was successfully logged on | Legitimate-looking logons with stolen credentials. Unexpected sources, hours, or accounts are the lead |
| 4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials | Logons that explicitly use someone else’s credentials via runas or PsExec | |
| 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon | Start of an admin-level session. On an account that should be a regular user, suspect credential abuse or misconfiguration | |
| 4722 A user account was enabled | Re-enabling and abusing departed or dormant accounts | |
| 4964 Special groups have been assigned to a new logon | Admin-level accounts logging on from unexpected hosts or at unexpected hours | |
| Supporting: 4634, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts | Supporting: 5138 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts | 4794 An attempt was made to set the DSRM administrator password | Logons with the DSRM account (the DC’s local administrator) |
| T1134 Access Token Manipulation | 4673 A privileged service was called | A record of an unexpected account actually using powerful privileges granted in 4672 |
| 4703 A user right (token privilege) was adjusted | Powerful privileges enabled by an unexpected process or account | |
| T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft | 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon | Sessions with SeImpersonatePrivilege are the starting point for potato-style privilege escalation |
| T1134.002 Create Process with Token | 4696 A primary token was assigned to process | Process execution with another user’s token (logged on older OS versions) |
| T1134.005 SID-History Injection | 4675 SIDs were filtered | Records privileged SIDs brought across a trust and removed by filtering |
| 4706 A new trust was created to a domain | A trust without SID filtering allows cross-trust escalation via SID History | |
| 4716 Trusted domain information was modified | With SID filtering off, privileged SIDs can be brought in via SID History | |
| 4765 SID History was added to an account | Injecting a privileged group’s SID into sIDHistory | |
| 4766 An attempt to add SID History to an account failed | Traces of a failed SID History injection attempt | |
| 4830 SID History was removed from an account | Attackers may also delete injected SID History to remove traces | |
| T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution | 4688 A new process has been created | Abuse of built-in binaries such as regsvr32 / mshta / rundll32 |
| T1542.003 Bootkit | 4826 Boot Configuration Data loaded | Settings that enable boot-level tampering such as bootkits |
| T1574.001 DLL | 6410 Code integrity determined that a file does not meet the requirements to load into a process | Loading of DLLs that fail signing requirements (side-loading and the like) |
Defense Impairment (TA0112)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1112 Modify Registry | 4657 A registry value was modified | Tampering with defense- or authentication-related values such as LSA Authentication Packages / Notification Packages |
| T1207 Rogue Domain Controller | 4928 An Active Directory replica source naming context was established | Replication relationships established with a non-legitimate DC (DCShadow and the like) |
| 4929 An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed | Removal of the relationship after a rogue DC was registered and used | |
| 4930 An Active Directory replica source naming context was modified | Changes to replication paths involving unexpected partners | |
| 4931 An Active Directory replica destination naming context was modified | Unexpected changes to destination settings | |
| Supporting: 4932, 4933, 4934 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1222.001 Windows Permissions | 4670 Permissions on an object were changed | DACL or owner changes on sensitive files and registry keys |
| Supporting: 4819, 4911, 4913 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1484.001 Group Policy Modification | 4704 A user right was assigned | If the right came through a GPO, check for Group Policy tampering |
| 4713 Kerberos policy was changed | Kerberos policy is distributed by domain Group Policy, so check it alongside GPO changes | |
| 4739 Domain Policy was changed | Weakening the domain password policy, for example by lowering the minimum length or disabling complexity | |
| 4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings have changed and were applied | Tampering with a GPO to loosen the firewall on every machine under it | |
| 5136 A directory service object was modified | Changes to Group Policy containers or gPCFileSysPath | |
| 5137 A directory service object was created | Creation of a new GPO | |
| Supporting: 4714, 5139, 6144 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1484.002 Trust Modification | 4706 A new trust was created to a domain | Adding a trust to a domain the attacker controls |
| 4707 A trust to a domain was removed | Unplanned trust removal | |
| 4716 Trusted domain information was modified | Disabling SID filtering or widening a trust’s direction or scope | |
| 4864 A namespace collision was detected | A collision where a trust partner claims an existing domain’s namespace | |
| 4865 A trusted forest information entry was added | Adding namespaces that should not be accepted, such as attacker-controlled domains | |
| 4866 A trusted forest information entry was removed | Unplanned removal of forest trust information | |
| 4867 A trusted forest information entry was modified | Widening a trust’s scope, for example by accepting a previously excluded namespace | |
| T1553.006 Code Signing Policy Modification | 4826 Boot Configuration Data loaded | Enabling test signing or disabling driver signature enforcement and integrity checks |
| T1556.002 Password Filter DLL | 4614 A notification package (password filter) has been loaded by the SAM | Loading of a notification package (password filter) the organization has not approved |
| T1556.005 Reversible Encryption | 4739 Domain Policy was changed | Enabling password storage with reversible encryption |
| T1685 Disable or Modify Tools | 4689 A process has exited | Unexpected termination of monitoring or defense processes such as EDR agents and log forwarders |
| 4701 A scheduled task was disabled | Disabling legitimate monitoring or security tasks | |
| 4705 A user right was removed | Removing rights that security products or backups need, to stop them working | |
| 5447 A Windows Filtering Platform filter has been changed | Adding WFP filters that block EDR traffic (EDRSilencer and the like) | |
| Supporting: 6406, 6408, 6419, 6420 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | 1100 The event logging service has shut down | An unplanned service stop halts logging. Normal shutdowns also log it, so pair it with 4608 |
| 4715 The audit policy (SACL) on an object was changed | Widening who can change audit policy, as a foothold for disabling auditing later | |
| 4719 System audit policy was changed | Disabling key subcategories such as process creation and logon with tools like auditpol | |
| 4817 Auditing settings on object were changed (Global Object Access) | Weakening or removing global SACLs to stop wide-ranging access auditing at once | |
| 4902 The Per-user audit policy table was created | A per-user setting planted to weaken auditing for specific accounts only | |
| 4905 An attempt was made to unregister a security event source | Unregistering a legitimate product’s event source to cut off its logs | |
| 4906 The CrashOnAuditFail value has changed | Disabling CrashOnAuditFail as groundwork before stopping auditing | |
| 4907 Auditing settings on object were changed | Removing SACLs from important objects so access goes unrecorded | |
| 4908 Special Groups Logon table modified | Removing monitored groups so special-group logons go unrecorded | |
| 4912 Per User Audit Policy was changed | Weakening auditing for specific accounts only, so activity goes unrecorded while the overall policy looks intact | |
| Supporting: 1104, 1108, 4612, 4621, 4904 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs | 1102 The audit log was cleared | Records the clearing of the Security log itself |
| 4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged object | Use of SeSecurityPrivilege can precede a log clear | |
| Supporting: 1105 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall | 4944 The policy active when the Windows Firewall started | The firewall starting in a disabled or loosened state |
| 4945 A rule was listed when the Windows Firewall started | Finding permanent allow rules that were planted | |
| 4946 A rule was added to the Windows Firewall exception list | Allow rules added for C2, remote access, or lateral movement | |
| 4947 A rule in the Windows Firewall exception list was modified | Rewriting an existing rule to widen what it allows | |
| 4948 A rule in the Windows Firewall exception list was deleted | Deletion of protective block rules | |
| 4949 Windows Firewall settings were restored to the default values | Wiping out defensive rules the organization added | |
| 4950 A Windows Firewall setting has changed | Disabling a profile or changing the default inbound action | |
| 4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings have changed and were applied | Weakened defenses from the applied settings | |
| 5025 The Windows Firewall Service has been stopped | Stopping the service to lift all traffic restrictions at once | |
| 5034 The Windows Firewall Driver was stopped | Stopping the driver disables packet filtering | |
| 5447 A Windows Filtering Platform filter has been changed | Manipulating WFP filters to disable blocks or insert allows | |
| Supporting: 4953, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5035, 5037 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1688 Safe Mode Boot | Supporting: 4608 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
Credential Access (TA0006)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1003 OS Credential Dumping | 4782 The password hash of an account was accessed | Password hash retrieval through the migration API |
| T1003.001 LSASS Memory | 4656 A handle to an object was requested | Handle requests to the LSASS process (requires a SACL on LSASS and the matching audit setting) |
| 4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon | SeDebugPrivilege is what LSASS memory reads rely on | |
| 4690 An attempt was made to duplicate a handle to an object | Duplicating an LSASS handle to read it without opening the process directly | |
| 4703 A user right (token privilege) was adjusted | Enabling SeDebugPrivilege before reading LSASS (such as mimikatz privilege::debug) | |
| Supporting: 5378 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1003.006 DCSync | 4662 An operation was performed on an object | DS-Replication-Get-Changes(-All) requested by a non-machine account |
| Supporting: 4932, 4933, 4934 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1110 Brute Force | 4739 Domain Policy was changed | Raising or disabling the lockout threshold paves the way for brute force |
| Supporting: 4767 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1110.001 Password Guessing | 4625 An account failed to log on | Many failures against one account in a short time |
| 4740 A user account was locked out | Repeated lockouts of a single account | |
| 4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed | Consecutive 0x18 failures against a single account | |
| 4776 The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account (NTLM) | Consecutive 0xC000006A failures against one account | |
| T1110.003 Password Spraying | 4625 An account failed to log on | A few failures each against many accounts from one source |
| 4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials | Bursts on a workstation suggest spraying or automation | |
| 4740 A user account was locked out | Lockouts of many accounts in a short time | |
| 4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed | 0x18 failures spreading from one source to many accounts | |
| 4776 The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account (NTLM) | 0xC000006A failures from one source against many accounts | |
| T1552.004 Private Keys | 5058 Key file operation | Private key files read or exported by an unexpected account |
| 5059 Key migration operation | Migrations (exports) that move private keys elsewhere | |
| Supporting: 5061 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1555 Credentials from Password Stores | 4692 Backup of data protection master key was attempted | A lead on attempts to reach DPAPI-protected stored credentials (browsers, Credential Manager) |
| 4693 Recovery of data protection master key was attempted | Master key recovery by an unexpected subject. A stolen domain DPAPI backup key decrypts any user’s protected data | |
| 4695 Unprotection of auditable protected data was attempted | Decryption of protected data by an unexpected subject or process | |
| Supporting: 4694 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager | 5376 Credential Manager credentials were backed up | Exporting Credential Manager contents through a bulk backup |
| 5377 Credential Manager credentials were restored from a backup | Restoring a backup obtained from another environment | |
| T1556.002 Password Filter DLL | 4614 A notification package (password filter) has been loaded by the SAM | Loading of a notification package (password filter) the organization has not approved |
| T1556.005 Reversible Encryption | 4739 Domain Policy was changed | Enabling password storage with reversible encryption |
| T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle | 4816 RPC detected an integrity violation while decrypting an incoming message | Signs of RPC messages tampered with in transit (often a fault instead) |
| T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | 5168 SPN check for SMB/SMB2 failed | SMB authentication failing on an SPN mismatch indicates NTLM relay |
| T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | 4611 A trusted logon process has been registered with the LSA | Rubeus registers the logon process User32LogonProcesss to get an LSA handle for ticket operations. Names outside the known legitimate set are the lead |
| 4673 A privileged service was called | Use of SeTcbPrivilege when Rubeus registers a logon process to get an LSA handle (read with 4611) | |
| T1558.003 Kerberoasting | 4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested | RC4 (0x17) service tickets, or requests for many SPNs in a short time |
| 5136 A directory service object was modified | Preparing targeted Kerberoasting by adding a servicePrincipalName | |
| Supporting: 4770 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting | 4738 A user account was changed | Changes to DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH (no pre-authentication) |
| 4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested | TGT requests with Pre-Authentication Type 0 | |
| T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | 4742 A computer account was changed | Certifried (CVE-2022-26923) preparation by rewriting dNSHostName |
| 5058 Key file operation | Stealing a certificate’s private key for impersonation | |
| 5059 Key migration operation | Stealing a certificate’s private key for impersonation | |
| Supporting: 4774 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
Discovery (TA0007)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1046 Network Service Discovery | 5150 The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet | Aggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts |
| 5151 A more restrictive Windows Filtering Platform filter has blocked a packet | Aggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts | |
| 5152 The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet (packet drop) | Aggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts | |
| 5153 A more restrictive Windows Filtering Platform filter has blocked a packet (packet drop) | Aggregating by source reveals port scans and connection attempts | |
| T1069.001 Local Groups | 4798 A user’s local group membership was enumerated | Enumeration of the local groups a user belongs to |
| 4799 A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated | Enumeration of local group members such as Administrators | |
| T1069.002 Domain Groups | 4661 A handle to an AD/SAM object was requested | Enumeration of group objects (BloodHound-style discovery and the like) |
| T1087.001 Local Account | 4798 A user’s local group membership was enumerated | Discovery of local account information |
| T1087.002 Domain Account | 4661 A handle to an AD/SAM object was requested | Broad read requests against SAM / AD user objects |
| 4662 An operation was performed on an object | Broad access to AD object attributes | |
| 4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested | Bursts of failures for non-existent usernames (0x6) indicate username enumeration | |
| T1201 Password Policy Discovery | 4793 The Password Policy Checking API was called | Probing the policy to narrow down password candidates |
Lateral Movement (TA0008)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1021 Remote Services | 4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials | Lateral movement that uses another account’s credentials to connect to other hosts |
| T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol | 4624 An account was successfully logged on | LogonType 10 (RDP) logons |
| 4778 A session was reconnected to a Window Station | The sequence of RDP remote access | |
| Supporting: 4634, 4647 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares | 4624 An account was successfully logged on | Spread of LogonType 3 logons via shares and remote administration |
| 5140 A network share object was accessed | Access to C$ / ADMIN$ | |
| 5145 A network share object was checked for desired access (detailed file share) | Access to named pipes under IPC$ (such as svcctl) reveals the remote execution path | |
| T1550.002 Pass the Hash | 4624 An account was successfully logged on | LogonType 3 with NTLM, or LogonType 9 with seclogo (overpass-the-hash) |
| 4776 The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account (NTLM) | NTLM authentication with a stolen hash is logged as a success | |
| T1550.003 Pass the Ticket | 4713 Kerberos policy was changed | Longer ticket lifetimes extend how long stolen tickets can be reused |
| Supporting: 4649 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1563.002 RDP Hijacking | 4778 A session was reconnected to a Window Station | A reconnect from an unexpected source suggests session hijacking |
| 4779 A session was disconnected from a Window Station | Sessions left disconnected can be hijacked later | |
| T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer | 5140 A network share object was accessed | Transferring tools to lateral-movement targets through admin shares |
| 5142 A network share object was added | Creating a share to distribute tools | |
| Supporting: 5143 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
Collection (TA0009)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1005 Data from Local System | 4656 A handle to an object was requested | Access requests to sensitive files and registry keys that have a SACL |
| 4663 An attempt was made to access an object | Reads of sensitive files | |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive | 5145 A network share object was checked for desired access (detailed file share) | Which files in a share were read, and by whom. Mass reads in a short time indicate data collection |
| Supporting: 5143 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1074.002 Remote Data Staging | 5142 A network share object was added | Creating a share to gather collected data |
| T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle | 4816 RPC detected an integrity violation while decrypting an incoming message | Signs of RPC messages tampered with in transit (often a fault instead) |
| T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | 5168 SPN check for SMB/SMB2 failed | SMB authentication failing on an SPN mismatch indicates NTLM relay |
Command and Control (TA0011)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1071 Application Layer Protocol | 5156 The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection | Which process connected to which destination (C2 traffic) |
| 5157 The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection | Blocked attempts to reach C2 | |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer | 4688 A new process has been created | File downloads with certutil.exe or bitsadmin |
| T1571 Non-Standard Port | 5156 The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection | Connections to non-standard ports |
Exfiltration (TA0010)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB | 4663 An attempt was made to access an object | Writes to removable storage |
| 6416 A new external device was recognized by the System | The starting point of exfiltration through USB storage | |
| 6423 The installation of this device is forbidden by system policy | Attempts to exfiltrate with USB storage | |
| Supporting: 6421, 6422, 6424 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |
Impact (TA0040)
| Technique | Event | What this event shows |
|---|---|---|
| T1485 Data Destruction | 4660 An object was deleted | Mass deletion by one process in a short time (wipers and the like) |
| T1490 Inhibit System Recovery | 4660 An object was deleted | Deletion of backup files |
| T1498 Network Denial of Service | 5148 WFP detected a DoS attack and entered a defensive mode | Start and end of a network DoS detected by WFP |
| 5149 The DoS attack has subsided and normal processing is being resumed | Start and end of a network DoS detected by WFP | |
| T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot | 4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged object | Use of the remote shutdown privilege by an unexpected subject |
| Supporting: 4608 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it | |
| T1531 Account Access Removal | 4718 System security access was removed from an account | Removing logon rights from legitimate or service accounts to block access |
| 4723 An attempt was made to change an account’s password | Changes by someone other than the owner, or many changes in a short time, suggest locking out legitimate users | |
| 4724 An attempt was made to reset an account’s password | Locking out the legitimate user through a reset | |
| 4725 A user account was disabled | Blocking access by disabling admins or other important accounts | |
| 4726 A user account was deleted | Deletion of important legitimate accounts | |
| 4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled global group | Removing legitimate admins from privileged groups | |
| 4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled local group | Removing legitimate admins from Administrators | |
| Supporting: 4730, 4734 | No direct mapping, but review alongside it |